27
disclosed the truth of what had occurred at the NAC.
160
Only after the proverbial cat was out of
the bag, did U.S. officials confirm the President’s statements and supply the missing words. By
the next day, the story of Bush’s secret statements had become a front-page story.
161
U.S. policy makers made it clear that it was the effort to develop the Franco-German
force into a full fledged European army, which provoked the showdown in Rome over NATO’s
future. According to the press, “U.S. officials confirmed that Bush's comment was directed at
French President Francois Mitterrand's proposals for a European army independent of
NATO.”
162
In no uncertain words, a senior White House Official (perhaps Scowcroft?) told
reporters that the specific cause of uncertainty within the administration was “what this Franco-
German army really means…. If they want this thing to complement our role in NATO that’s
fine. But if they really do plan to operate outside of NATO, then we’re saying ‘fine, we’re outta
here’.”
163
Another source confirmed that a senior administration official disclosed that the
United States was reacting to the October announcement that the Franco-German brigade would
be expanded to a 30,000-50,000 size corps. “These are ominous undercurrents and rumblings
that are causing us some uneasiness. Since today is the day we are redefining NATO, let's just
get this all out in the open.”
164
Analysis
The press who witnessed this first round of the post-Cold War debate between NATO
and ESDI described it as “just another angry re-run of the age-old conflict between the pro-
NATO Anglo-Saxons and the anti-NATO French.”
165
According to one observer, little progress
had been made. “The Americans would still prefer to maintain their dominant role in NATO
(whatever they may say about the merits of partnership with Europe). Equally clearly, the French
continue to resent and resist America's dominant role (whatever they may say about the
importance of the Atlantic Alliance).”
166
The diplomats, however, saw the Rome Summit as a clear success for NATO. In fact,
some diplomats were afraid that the win might have been too strong, perhaps even rude. A
senior NATO official said that the victory in Rome “could make things awkward for the EU
160
Ray Moseley, “Bush to NATO: Should U.S. Stay?” Chicago Tribune, (November 8, 1991): C1. Wilbur G.
Landrey, “Bush Challenges NATO Members Over Future of U.S. in Europe,” St. Petersburg Times, (November 8,
1991): 2A.
161
Alan Cowell, “Bush Challenges Partners in NATO Over Role of U.S.,” New York Times, (November 8, 1991):
A1. William Drozdiak and Ann Devroy, “Bush Challenges Europeans to Define U.S. NATO Role,” Washington
Post, (November 8, 1991): A1. David Usborne, Sarah Helm, and Charles Richards, “EC Ambitions Threaten
NATO, Bush Warns,” The Independent, (November 8, 1991): 1.
162
Ibid.
163
Greg McDonald, “Make Decision, NATO is Told,” Houston Chronicle, (November 8, 1991): A1.
164
William Drozdiak and Ann Devroy, “Bush Challenges Europeans to Define U.S. NATO Role,” Washington
Post, (November 8, 1991): A1.
165
Ian Davidson, “An Innovative Bit of Theatre,” Financial Times, (November 11, 1991): I34.
166
Ibid.
Convention