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Reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries…to launch
a major initiative through a Partnership for Peace, in which we invite Partners to join us in new
political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance
.
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The PfP was a compromise on NATO’s part. Russian reaction to the prospect of NATO
enlargement clearly demonstrated that Russia had a stake in the alliance’s enlargement.
Furthermore, it was clear that Russia felt excluded from the Western community. The complaints
Russia offered in its study on enlargement highlighted the problems with NATO’s previous
methods of engaging Russia. By the beginning of 1994, NATO had realized that in order for
NATO to build a stable European security architecture, without drawing new dividing lines in the
process, Russia needed special attention and recognition. By launching the PfP as the first step in
admitting new members to the alliance, NATO was essentially “buying time” in an effort to pacify
Russian unrest. Russian reaction to NATO enlargement clearly demonstrated that Russia felt
isolated from the enlargement dialogue. This isolation, in turn, created a problem with NATO
enlargement. Enlargement could not proceed peacefully with an agitated Russia to the East.
Furthermore, it was clear that if NATO continued to position Russia as it had since the end of the
Cold War—as one of the many former Soviet bloc countries—that enlargement would create
another dividing line in Europe. Russia had demanded special recognition; the PfP was one step in
granting such recognition and destroying the hierarchy the earlier NATO policies sought to create.
The boundary was drawn because NATO refused to give Russia its sought role in the new European
security architecture.
Russia and the Partnership for Peace: Accepting NATO’s counter role?
During the beginning months of 1994, Russian leaders fiercely debated how Russia would react to
NATO, enlargement, and the PfP. At parliamentary meetings and proceedings both sides of the
debate were voiced—those advocating partnership and those calling for rejection of PfP. At one
extreme a Russian rejection of the partnership could mean Russia’s isolation from Europe. But the
other extreme still viewed the West suspiciously and saw the PfP as a mechanism for Western
manipulation of Russian interests. At the foundation of both of these extremes were differing views
on Russia’s position vis-à-vis NATO. NATO’s view of Russia had clearly changed since the
London Declaration in November 1991. At that time, NATO viewed Russia as another vulnerable
former Soviet state trying to recover from the perils of communism. However, as the enlargement
question arose, NATO was forced to recognize that Russia had different political needs and
concerns than the other Central and Eastern European nations. Furthermore, NATO realized that
its policy of treating the entire former Soviet bloc the same had isolated Russia from the community:
While the old tactic of re-integration into the West hasn’t worked, that is, there has been no reward
for the break with communism, then the revival of the threat from the Russian bear is viewed as the
key that will open the door for Eastern Europe to NATO and the European Community, that is, one
way or the other, it will help accomplish the task of securing Western support
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In essence, through its equal treatment of all former Soviet states, NATO created a new boundary
within Europe—one that lied along the Russian border. Agitated by NATO’s failure to positively
recognize its equal status vis-à-vis Europe, Russia foreign policy toward NATO was inconsistent
between 1991 and 1994. These abrupt changes in Russian policy led the nations of Central and
Eastern Europe to look West for security guarantees. Ironically, this Westward movement on the
part of the Central and Eastern European countries only further isolated Russia and encouraged
further policy fluctuations. These fluctuations were magnified by NATO’s ambivalent and vague
policies toward Russia.
Convention