4
Military assistance programmes have been chosen for a number of reasons. First,
Russia and Ukraine have a long and difficult history, which has created a high degree of
mistrust and suspicion on both sides.
9
This historical legacy remains a potent force that
continues to shape and influence relations between these states. Russia and Ukraine share
a common history tainted by expansionism and insecurity. Programmes aimed at
restructuring, democratising and increasing the interoperability of Russia and Ukrainian
armed forces with the West and increasing democratic control over foreign and defence
policy will ameliorate insecurity. Externally funded programmes can help ease the suspicion
and mistrust between these neighbours that has coloured and damaged relations in the
early years of independence, thereby creating and sustaining the enabling conditions for co-
operation and regional stability.
Second, foreign military assistance is an essential part of security sector reform in
both Russia and Ukraine. The security sector is a term that has been adopted by many
countries and international organisations as well as non-governmental organisations
working in the field of security. The security sector reform (SSR) agenda calls for a wider
and deeper understanding of the security transition in newly independent states. Widening
the definition would necessitate including all organisations and institutions responsible for
the provision of security in a state – this would include the regular armed forces, paramilitary
and irregular forces, police and other law enforcement forces, judiciary and the wider
societal groups with a role to play.
10
Deepening would necessitate placing the security
sector within the large context of democratisation taking place within a state. Democracy in
Russia and Ukraine cannot succeed without the transformation of the security sector, and
vice versa: the two are inseparably linked and interdependent. An unreformed security
sector can denude society of resources and the control needed for the transition process. It
8
Askold Krushelnycky, ‘CIS: What Does Kuchma’s New Post Say about the Alliance?’ RFE/RL, 30
January 2003.
9
For a discussion of this issues see, Deborah Sanders, Security Cooperation between Russia and
Ukraine in the Post-Soviet Era, Palgrave, 2001. pp.40-42, 64-68.
10
For a discussion see Tim Edmunds, ‘Defining Security Sector Reform’, CMR Network, October 2001.
Convention