19
best achieved through restraint.
40
Defensive realists share many of the same assumptions as
offensive realists; they too believe that states must be vigilant to insure their security in an
anarchic world. But defensive realists believe that more often than not, expansionism is
counterproductive; that the use of force leads other states to form countervailing alliances, and
that defense is easier than offense.
41
Offensive and defensive realists share the assumption that
countries’ foreign policies are driven primarily by their concern for enhancing their security, and
they both recognize that the constraints of anarchy will lead states to pursue sometimes
aggressive and sometimes restrained strategies.
42
Realist thinkers have identified a set of foreign policy strategies that states may pursue to
mitigate the dangers of anarchy. Two aggressive strategies include conquest—military
expansion to gain regional hegemony—and bandwagoning for profit—aligning with a strong,
aggressive state to gain some of its spoils of war.
43
One defensive strategy is balancing: building
military power, finding allies, and confronting aggressive states.
44
A second defensive strategy,
buck-passing, consists of keeping one’s head down and hoping that the enemy gets caught up in
40
Offensive realism is often mischaracterized as predicting that states will always pursue aggressive policies; this is
incorrect. See Mearsheimer, pp. 76-79; 164-65. The conditions under which offensive realists believe that restraint
is more prudent than expansion are discussed below.
41
Prominent works in the defensive realist school include Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,”
International Security Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma
Revisited,” World Politics Vol. 50 (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic
Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Stephen Van Evera, Causes of
War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
42
For analyses of intra-realist debates see Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17-22; Jeffrey W.
Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security Vol. 25, No. 3
(Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161; Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World
Politics Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172; Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International
Organization Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477; Benjamin Frankel, “Restating the Realist Case: An
Introduction,” Security Studies Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996).
43
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great power Politics, p. 162-64, Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit.”
44
On balancing see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, and Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press,1987). Other strategies exist; for a discussion see Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, Chapter 5.
Convention