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We have painted ourselves into this corner--quite deliberately
-- and I only hope that
developments will justify the course we have followed. In sum, we risked the Summit by
hitting Hanoi and Haiphong. After we have gone through your meeting of May 2, we may
be faced with the hard decision to risk it again and probably damage it irreparably because
we may have no other choice if that meeting turns out to be a failure.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that except for a few sophisticated foreign policy
observers, interest in what we are able to get on a SALT agreement, trade, a better
communiqué than the French got, etc., will not save the Summit unless one way or another
we are able to point to some progress on Vietnam. Of course, I am aware of the fact that if
your hosts still want to go forward with the Summit, despite the actions we may have had
to take after May 2, we will do so because we know that the substantive agreements that we
will reach at the Summit are in and of themselves substantively very important even
without progress on Vietnam. What I am trying to emphasize is that we must face the hard
fact that we have now convinced the country that Soviet arms and Soviet tanks have fueled
this massive invasion of South Vietnam by the North. Having done so, it is only logical that
our critics on both right and left will hammer us hard if we sit down and meet with the
Soviets, drink toasts, sign communiqués, etc., without getting progress on Vietnam
(Foreign Relations, document #110).
In short, Nixon believed he would have to cancel the summit if no progress was made soon on Vietnam
(see also, Nixon 1978: 593-94).
On April 25, the administration announced Kissinger’s trip to Moscow along with the resumption
of plenary sessions with the North Vietnamese on April 27. Nixon instructed Haldeman to poll after his
April 26 speech with the idea of getting it into the media if it supported their position, but to “flush it” it if
it did not support their position (Conversation 332-35, April 25, 1972, NWHT). In his speech, Nixon
announced the withdrawal of another 20,000 Americans down to a total of 49,000 by July 1 (most would
be withdrawn at the end of the period presumably after the North Vietnamese offense had been turned),
his insistence that he would not halt the bombing until the North Vietnamese offensive had stopped, and
rejected ceasing the bombing as a condition for returning to the negotiating table (Nixon 1978:593).
Despite South Vietnam’s precarious state, the administration felt the announcement was necessary to
communicate their confidence in Vietnamization and to sap potential criticism associated with the
escalation of the bombing (Hersh, 1983: 515; Kissinger, 1979:1166).
On May 1, Nixon and Kissinger were shocked to hear from the American commander in Vietnam
that the South Vietnamese might have lost their will to fight and might be on the verge of collapse. Nixon
Convention