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summit himself. Haldeman’s notes captured the calculus: “can’t lose war – will lose country if
lose war; won’t lose country if lose summit” (H.R. Haldeman Notes, May 4, 1972).
Later that afternoon, Nixon met first with Haldeman and Kissinger who were later joined
by Connally. Nixon moved to announce that he had decided to bomb North Vietnam and not
cancel the summit. “Then if the Russians cancel, we’ll blockade. We will blockade and continue
to bomb. But we are now going to win the war. That is my decision.” Kissinger (sounding
somewhat flustered) replied, “Mr. President, ahh…” Nixon did not give him a chance to
respond, “It may cost the election, I don’t give a shit. But, we’re going to win the war.” Nixon
concluded that domestically, the time to act was right, “Right now, we’ve done everything to get
their [the Soviets] attention, we have as much public support as we can get; it will deteriorate as
the Senate continues to beat us over the head and the bad news comes from the war. We have
got to do something positive. Give some encouragement to our friends at home, some
encouragement to our allies abroad.” Nixon had concluded along with Connally that, “One thing
that can’t happen is losing this war. It cannot happen. Understand?…I mean we are going to
cream those bastards. And we are going to cream them good.” Gaining his feet in the face of
Nixon’s presentation, Kissinger suggested that Nixon should go for the blockade first because it
had the advantages of being unexpected, not engendering bureaucratic opposition immediately,
and not creating an emotional outcry domestically.
Thinking of how they could sell their policy, Nixon stated: “I think, Bob, that Connally
believes that even if the Russians cancel, if we win the war we are still in business.” Haldeman:
“Yes.” Nixon speculated that he had done the “man of peace” thing with the trip to China, the
secret negotiations (announced in January of that year), and the troops withdrawals. They could
argue that the “man of peace” has had “enough.”
Convention