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would only be temporary and would dissipate by the time of the election. Since the bombing and
blockade only offered the prospect of ending the war in the long term, as the war dragged on, he believed
support from his core constituency and the public at large would slowly erode. By the time of the
election, Nixon believed the escalatory policy might likely be an electoral negative. While the objective
behaviors in 1972 might at first appear to be consistent with the theory, the actual decision making
motivations pursued by the administration conflict with the theory’s expectations since Nixon did not
escalate the war in Vietnam to enhance the support of key constituencies or to bolster his standing in the
polls. The evidence suggests that he believed his actions potentially risked both. Since each of the 1968
and 1972 cases provided ample opportunity and ripe conditions for diversionary behavior, the fact that the
administration’s motivations were inconsistent with the model’s predictions provides strong evidence
against this perspective.
The foreign policy avoidance model receives mixed support. In 1964, consistent with the model,
Johnson acted to remove the issues from the national agenda as quickly as he could and to put off any
potentially controversial decisions until after the election. Before Johnson was a lame duck in 1968
(Pueblo and Tet cases), he should have attempted to avoid foreign policy issues. However, on the Pueblo
issue, Johnson chose the policy of diplomacy even though he knew that it would ensure that the issue
would continue throughout the election year. After the Tet offensive, Johnson launched a negotiating
initiative and bombing halt to change his policy on Vietnam. This policy does not comply with the view
that he would reject foreign policy initiatives because of their risk (if he is considered a candidate) or be
unable to launch initiatives on foreign policy (if he is considered a non-candidate). On the other hand, the
administration found itself limited by Soviet behavior that seemed to focus, in part, on Johnson’s lame
duck status during the Czechoslovakian crisis. The Soviets launched the invasion the day before the U.S.
and Soviet Union were to announce a summit and the opening of arms control negotiations. The Soviets
also decided to defer the opening of arms control negotiations and a summit during the rest of the Johnson
administration despite the repeated attempts by the Americans to get them started. In 1972, while some in
the administration suggested behavior consistent with the model (Secretary of Defense Laird suggested
Convention