4
the leader and create an artificial upsurge in public approval of the leader's job performance (Mueller,
1973; Brody, 1984; Kernell, 1986; Brace and Hinckley, 1992). The central element in these approaches is
that declining domestic support, either by the public at large or by key constituencies, is associated with
uses of force especially before elections (Ostrom and Job, 1986; James and Oneal, 1991; Morgan and
Bickers, 1992; Wang, 1996; Morgan and Anderson, 1999). These choices might be particularly tempting
if an election occurs when the incumbent is unpopular, the economy is in poor shape (Russett, 1990; Hess
and Orphanides, 1995), the election is expected to be tightly contested (Huth, 1998), or in the midst of an
ongoing war (Stoll, 1984; Fordham, 1998). These results suggest that presidents attempt to employ uses
of force to bolster their domestic political situation.
In a wide-ranging discussion of the effect of the election cycle on foreign policy, William Quandt
(1986) suggested that presidents choose to avoid foreign policy decisions during election years if at all
possible (foreign policy avoidance). When a president is running for reelection, Quandt concludes that
presidents will focus on the risks associated with foreign endeavors and choose to avoid foreign policy
issues based on fears that action might damage their reelection efforts. Lame-duck presidents find
themselves often willing (with an eye on their historical legacy) but unable to pursue significant foreign
policies during their final year in office as their domestic power ebbs and foreign leaders delay until after
a successor takes office. Recent statistical analyses have suggested that democratic states pursue less
policy initiatives in both negotiation and military escalation as elections approach (Huth and Allee 2002).
Some scholars have focused on prevailing public preferences and suggest that leaders become
highly responsive during election years (responsive leader). In this view, regardless of their other policy
objectives, leaders want to remain in power (Mayhew, 1974) and the public pays attention to foreign
policy when making vote choices (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida, 1989; Nincic and Hinckley, 1991).
Research has suggested that leaders are held accountable for foreign policy failures such that ones who
involve their countries in losing foreign policy efforts are more likely to be removed from office (Bueno
de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Siverson, 1998). At the same time, there might be costs associated with
not acting forcefully enough in the public's eyes once a commitment has been made (Fearon, 1994, 1997).
Convention