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strong past or present grievances against Georgians or Georgian rule. Moreover, neither Armenia
nor Azerbaijan wanted to jeopardize vital transportation links by destabilizing Georgia in an
uncontrollable manner. Azerbaijan might conceivably have supported separatist movements
among Muslim minorities in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. However,
Azerbaijani leaders did not seriously contemplate such a strategy, because it would predictably
have drawn devastating Russian retaliation.
Northwestern Iran is predominantly populated by Azeris.
9
Ethnic Azeri movements and
leaders supported Khomeini against the Shah in an effort to gain greater cultural autonomy. Once
in power, Khomeini continued to impose a highly centralized regime. Revolutionary Guards
brutally crushed Azeri resistance. Needless to say, Iranian leaders were not pleased when APF
leaders, starting in the late Soviet period, began to speak publicly of reuniting “Northern” and
“Southern” Azerbaijan--i.e. the Azerbaijani SSR and the northwestern provinces of Iran (Shaffer
2000). This threat is the principal reason for Iran’s tactical alliance with Russia, and for her
tendency to support Christian Armenia over Muslim Azerbaijan. Iran only intervened once in the
Armenian-Azeri conflict. Her troops temporarily crossed the Azerbaijani frontier in order to keep
open a corridor for Azeri refugees to flee east into unoccupied Azerbaijan, rather than south into
Iran. This prevented a large and possibly destabilizing Azeri refugee population from moving
into Azeri regions of Iran (Croissant 1998, 92-3). Apart from this, Iran was quite happy to see
Azerbaijan weakened by Armenia and the Karabakh Armenians, and to see the reformist Elcibey
government replaced by the conservative Aliev regime. Here Russia and Iran saw eye to eye.
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Estimates are that Azeris constitute one-quarter to one-third of the entire Iranian population.
Convention