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Iran, and Afghanistan, regime type, balance of power calculations, and international models had
similar effects on decisions to escalate.
In the first section, this explanation is outlined by setting out the characteristics of the
main strategic actors, and then by tracing the decisions of these actors through the typical phases
of late Soviet and post-Soviet political development. The second section applies the framework
to explain the diffusion, escalation, and termination of ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova, and Tajikistan.
Theory
The diffusion, escalation, and termination of ethnic conflicts are in the first instance
explained by state and sub-state actor choices about whether and how to employ organized
violence. These decisions depend on the actors’ preferences and capabilities. Such actors also
interact strategically. The choice that best accomplishes an actor’s goals usually depends not just
on their own capabilities, but also on the likely responses of other actors.
Some preliminary points can be made about actor types. First, it is helpful to distinguish
state regime types in the very general terms of authoritarianism vs. democracy. This is a
continuum rather than a dichotomy. However, a basic distinction can be made between highly
authoritarian and relatively democratic regime types. In highly authoritarian regimes, the only
preferences that matter are those of leaders and a relative narrow circle of allies and key
constituents. Such authoritarian power elites are likely to care more for preserving regime
survival than for furthering the widely held goals of the dominant ethno-national group. If ethnic
conflict is expected to endanger regime survival, and if active pursuit of widely-held nationalist
objectives makes ethnic conflict more likely, authoritarian leaders are typically willing to
sacrifice or compromise the nationalist objectives. In relatively democratic regimes, on the other
Convention