8
Where elite and mass followings were stronger and broader, such ideologies tended to make
strong inroads into the Republics’ local communist parties (CPs), which were dominated or at
least heavily staffed by members of the titular ethnic group. Such ideologically compromised
Republic CPs tended to allow greater scope for the activities of reform nationalist movements,
and gradually, to internalize and implement portions of their reform agendas. On the other hand,
Republic authorities typically confronted weaker reform nationalist movements with
indifference, harassment, and repression. Such conservative Republic CP leaderships seemed
most concerned with preserving their privileged positions in the status quo political and
economic arrangements.
5
hypothesized that such ideologies were stronger where the Soviet period was perceived as setting
back a greater national potential. This potential is inferred from the existence of great political
and economic achievements in the pre-Soviet histories of the various peoples. In the presence of
pre-Soviet “golden pasts,” Soviet-era repression, territorial grievances, and ethnic minority
threats to territorial integrity tended to be more highly resented (Horowitz 2003).
5
There are two mutually reinforcing factors that explain these differences in Republic CP
responses. The first is the extent to which reform nationalist ideologies and movements were able
to make genuine inroads in the public, among opposition elites, and within the CP elite itself.
The second is the extent to which careerist CP elites were more likely to making accommodating
compromises in the face of more popular nationalist movements. In analyzing CP elite responses,
is difficult to determine the relative importance of these motives. On the other hand, it is clear
that careerism alone should be present everywhere, and so cannot account for variation in the
extent to which CP elites were ideologically “converted.”
Convention