29
the fall, as stalemate descended on the continent, it became evident that the war would be prolonged, but
British officials still intended to limit their commitment to the land war and let their allies carry the burden.
By early 1915 the huge casualties suffered by the French and Russian armies made this strategy untenable, but
the British still sought other ways to defeat Germany other than putting a large army on the continent.
Tightening up the blockade so as to deny food to the German home front was, along with peripheral
operations like Gallipoli, one of the means chosen. The exact timing, however, was determined by
Germany’s declaration of submarine warfare in February, which allowed the British to justify the move to
neutral countries, especially the all-important United States, as a reprisal. From there on out, Britain worked
unceasingly to increase the effectiveness of the blockade.
“THE EPITOME OF GERMAN BARBARISM”:
UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I
147
1916 was the year of crisis for the Central Powers. The Battle of Jutland, although a tactical victory for the
High Seas Fleet, simply underscored the fact that Germany’s vaunted battleships were impotent to affect the
outcome of the war at sea or on land. The Verdun offensive, designed to bleed the French white, was
bleeding the German Army almost as much. To relieve the pressure on their French allies, the British Army
launched a massive offensive on the Somme, which drained German manpower reserves even further. In the
East, Russia’s Brusilov Offensive had burst through the Austrian lines, captured huge numbers of prisoners,
and would take the Russian Army into Hungary itself. Finally, the last blow of the hammer fell as Romania
declared war against the Central Powers in late August and invaded the Hungarian province of Transylvania.
In this crisis environment, the U-boat issue could not lie fallow for long.
148
As defeat stared them in
the face, German officials grew more desperate as the year went on. Finally, in December, Bethmann and the
Kaiser allowed themselves to be convinced by the Naval Staff’s (Admiralstab) repeated arguments and
gambled that a campaign of unrestricted warfare with submarines could finish off Great Britain before the
United States could come to the rescue. As defeat appeared certain if Germany remained on the defensive,
German leaders believed they had nothing to lose by unleashing the U-boats. In the event, the campaign
failed to knock Britain out, brought America into the war, and sealed Germany’s fate. The Admiralstab
understated the amount of shipping available to Britain and thus grossly underestimated the tonnage that
would have to be sunk to produce a crisis for British food imports. Nor did they take into account British
adjustments—such as the convoy system—that would decrease the efficacy of the submarine campaign. The
important point, however, is not that German reasoning was faulty, or that the U-boat campaign of 1917
stood little chance of success. Both are true. The key point is that prosecuting a submarine offensive a
outrance was the only strategy the German High Command could see that offered some chance of victory. If
the campaign failed, defeat was certain, but it was also certain if Germany did nothing. In these
circumstances, German leaders felt like they had no choice but to roll the dice.
THE FOUR HAMMER BLOWS AND THE CHANGE IN THE HIGH COMMAND
His Verdun offensive in tatters, calls for chief of the General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn’s head were not
long in coming. By early July, when the British unleashed their attack on the Somme, Verdun had consumed
147
Laurence Moyer, Victory Must Be Ours: Germany in the Great War 1914-1918 (London: Leo Cooper, 1995), 191.
148
There had already been two decisions against launching unrestricted submarine warfare. First, chief of the Naval
Staff Admiral Hugo von Pohl managed to convince Kaiser Wilhelm to order unlimited U-boat warfare in February 1915,
but the order was rescinded before the campaign began. Second, Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of the General Staff,
advocated unrestricted submarine warfare as an accompaniment to his massive attrition campaign at Verdun. The
Kaiser and the chancellor, however, did not believe the situation was so desperate as to take run such grave risks. For an
analysis of these two previous decisions, see Downes, Targeting Civilians in War, Chapter 8.
Convention