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Federalism is a normative political philosophy that recommends the use of federal
principles, i.e. combining joint action and self-government (King 1982). ‘Federal
political systems’ is a descriptive catchall term for all political organizations that combine
what Daniel Elazar called ‘shared rule and self-rule’. Federal political systems, thus
broadly construed, include federations, confederations, unions, federacies, associated
states, condominiums, leagues, and cross-border functional authorities (Elazar 1987).
Federations are very distinct federal political systems (Watts 1998; Watts 1987). In a
genuinely democratic federation there is a compound sovereign state, in which at least
two governmental units, the federal and the regional, enjoy constitutionally separate
competencies - although they may also have concurrent powers. Both the federal and the
regional governments are empowered to deal directly with their citizens, and the relevant
citizens directly elect (at least some components of) the federal and regional
governments. In a federation the federal government usually cannot unilaterally alter the
horizontal division of powers: constitutional change affecting competencies requires the
consent of both levels of government. Therefore federation automatically implies a
codified and written constitution, and normally is accompanied at the federal level by a
supreme court, charged with umpiring differences between the governmental tiers, and by
a bicameral legislature – in which the federal as opposed to the popular chamber may
disproportionately represent the smallest regions. Elazar emphasized the ‘covenantal’
character of federations, i.e. the authority of each government is derived from a
constitution and convention rather than from another government.
Federations vary in the extent to which they are majoritarian in character, but most
constrain the power of federation-wide majorities. They constrain the federal demos,
though there is extensive variation in this respect (Stepan 2001: 340-57). The United
States, Australia and Brazil allow equal representation to each of their regions in the
federal chamber, which means massive over-representation for the smaller ones. Other
federations also over-represent less populous units, but not to this extent. Federations
differ additionally in the competences granted the federal chamber. Some, such as the
US Senate are extremely powerful, and which is arguably more powerful than the House
of Representatives because of its special powers over nominations to public office and in
treaty-making; others, including those in Canada, India, and Belgium are weak (Watts
1999: 93-4). Individual regions in some instances can block constitutional change,
although normally a veto requires a coalition of regions. A federation is majoritarian to
the extent that it lacks consociational practices of executive power-sharing,
proportionality principles of representation and allocation, cultural autonomy and veto-
rights; and it is majoritarian to the extent that it lacks consensual institutions or practices
– such as the separation of powers, bills of rights, and courts and monetary institutions
insulated from immediate governing majorities. A majoritarian federation concentrates
power-resources at the federal level and facilitates executive and legislative dominance
either by a popularly endorsed executive president or by a single party premier and
cabinet.
The federal principle of separate competencies says nothing about how much power each
level enjoys. Regions in some federations may enjoy less de facto power than those in
Convention