members’ decisions on the gag rule. Second, I analyze the long-term voting histories that
members developed on this recurring question. Despite the conventional expectation that
members adhere rigidly to a fixed position on recurring questions, I find and explain significant
instability in member voting. As I describe, this instability among continuing members
ultimately played a part in the gag’s reversal in the 28
th
Congress. Third, and more generally, I
return to the bigger picture of antebellum congressional politics by discussing the substantive
implications of gag rule politics for the structure of the second party system. Before I present my
findings, however, I review theoretical expectations about vote choice and vote change set in the
antebellum context, and I also provide a synoptic account of the gag rule’s history.
Vote Choice and Vote Change
We know from the complementary works of Kingdon (1977, 1989) and Arnold (1990)
that contemporary members’ voting decisions result from a complex process. This process has
its origins in a hierarchy of member goals in which reelection is the primary motivation but goals
of policy and power/influence also play a role. Since reelection is the proximate goal for
members (Mayhew 1974), calculations about the electoral consequences of vote decisions
occupy center stage in the decision process (Arnold 1990, 60; Kingdon 1977, 575) and involve
assessing the preferences of actual and potential constituencies (Arnold 1990, ch. 4). Members
must make these estimations and arrive at decisions that best satisfy their full set of goals “while
constrained by limits on time and cognitive capacity to do so without extensive study of each
issue” (Kingdon 1977, 569; also Arnold 1990, 84-85). Necessarily, then, members rely on
decision shortcuts in their pursuit of electoral and other goals.
While this electorally-centered picture of congressional decision making has become
axiomatic for the contemporary Congress, its application in other contexts remains a subject of
2
Convention