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Vote Choice and Vote Change in the Antebellum House: Evidence from the Gag Rule, 1836-1845
Unformatted Document Text:  debate. The political science literature on the 19 th century Congress offers some contradictory perspectives on the strength of the electoral connection and constituency influence in member decision making. It is well-established that career patterns during Congress’ first century differ substantially from those of its second century (Kernell 1977; Polsby 1968; Young 1966). The turnover rates in the early Congress do not appear to support contemporary assumptions about electoral motivations. At the same time, recent research has uncovered some evidence of an electoral connection among nineteenth century members. Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson (1996) demonstrate both electorally-driven voting behavior and electoral consequences in the case of the Compensation Act of 1816, and Goodman (2002) connects aggregate roll-call voting behavior with constituency characteristics in the antebellum House. These findings suggest a type of electoral connection despite the rarity of professionalized, career members in the nineteenth century context. Swift (1987) provides a relevant argument that extends electoral motivations to the low-autonomy antebellum House: though turnover was high, members who left the House were very likely to pursue other elected offices that demanded strong constituency support. Polsby’s portrayal of “lateral movement” in nineteenth century political careers lends credence to this argument (1968, 148). In short, though members of the antebellum House may not perfectly follow contemporary patterns of decision making, we have reason to expect that the goal-driven, electorally-focused models of voting have may application to the early House. The Vote History and Instability The Kingdon and Arnold models emphasize shortcuts and cue-taking as a necessary part of contemporary House voting. When a member is dealing with recurring votes on a similar question, the vote history is itself a valuable decision cue (Arnold 1990, 87; Asher and Weisberg 1978; Kingdon 1989, 275). The vote history is, in turn, a source of stability in members’ 3

Authors: Meinke, Scott.
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debate. The political science literature on the 19
th
century Congress offers some contradictory
perspectives on the strength of the electoral connection and constituency influence in member
decision making. It is well-established that career patterns during Congress’ first century differ
substantially from those of its second century (Kernell 1977; Polsby 1968; Young 1966). The
turnover rates in the early Congress do not appear to support contemporary assumptions about
electoral motivations. At the same time, recent research has uncovered some evidence of an
electoral connection among nineteenth century members. Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson (1996)
demonstrate both electorally-driven voting behavior and electoral consequences in the case of the
Compensation Act of 1816, and Goodman (2002) connects aggregate roll-call voting behavior
with constituency characteristics in the antebellum House. These findings suggest a type of
electoral connection despite the rarity of professionalized, career members in the nineteenth
century context. Swift (1987) provides a relevant argument that extends electoral motivations to
the low-autonomy antebellum House: though turnover was high, members who left the House
were very likely to pursue other elected offices that demanded strong constituency support.
Polsby’s portrayal of “lateral movement” in nineteenth century political careers lends credence to
this argument (1968, 148). In short, though members of the antebellum House may not perfectly
follow contemporary patterns of decision making, we have reason to expect that the goal-driven,
electorally-focused models of voting have may application to the early House.
The Vote History and Instability

The Kingdon and Arnold models emphasize shortcuts and cue-taking as a necessary part
of contemporary House voting. When a member is dealing with recurring votes on a similar
question, the vote history is itself a valuable decision cue (Arnold 1990, 87; Asher and Weisberg
1978; Kingdon 1989, 275). The vote history is, in turn, a source of stability in members’
3


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