Author's Keywords: Cabinets Partisan Ministers Parliamentary Monarchies Parliamentary Republics Semi-presidential Republics Presidential Republics Legislative Fragmentation	Convention All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64646_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Amorim Neto, Octavio. and Samuels, David. "Cabinet Partisanship and Regime Type in Contemporary Democracies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64646_index.html>

Amorim Neto, O. and Samuels, D. , 2003-08-27 "Cabinet Partisanship and Regime Type in Contemporary Democracies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64646_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This paper provides a simple theory to understand the relative incentives chief executives face to appoint partisans or non-partisans to cabinet ministries. In systems where the chief executive depends on a legislative majority for policy success, the chief executive must appoint partisans to the cabinet. In systems where the chief executive possesses independent powers and thus depends relatively less on a legislative majority for policy success, the chief executive has a wider range of cabinet appointment options available. We explore cabinet dynamics across all regime types: parliamentary monarchies and republics, semi-presidential systems, and presidential regimes. Our dependent variable is the share of non-partisans in the cabinet, and the key independent variable is the system of government (later iterations of this paper will add cabinet coalescence as a dependent variable). The four types of political regimes can be arrayed along a continuum from weakest to strongest head of state - from ceremonial monarchs to powerful presidents. As the head of state becomes stronger, he or she will possess greater autonomous powers � to appoint and dismiss ministers and bureaucrats, and to decree laws or other regulations � to make policy unilaterally. The more extensive are such powers, the lower partisanship in the cabinet. Our empirical analysis of 437 cabinets in 57 countries strongly confirms this argument. Our findings reveal that institutional format substantially differentiates the degree of partisanship in governments around the world. We then discuss how these differences are critical for understanding executive-legislative relations under different constitutional structures.

Cabinet Politics and Presidential Power: The transformations of executive governance in American political development

Variation within semi-presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers