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forums for policy development. However, these parties remain in opposition, making policy
exercises somewhat fanciful; their effect on a government in power (or even a party close to
winning power) is unknown.
These membership patterns may affect discipline and cohesion in party caucuses, but in
different ways that yield the above mixed patterns. Unstable memberships means that dissenting
MPs cannot necessarily count on retaining the support of their constituency association, if a
challenger signs up more members. While party elites do not appear to actively support local
challenges against dissenters, in a few cases leaders can and have unilaterally appointed
candidates in order to assist loyal MPs facing tough nomination fights. The ability to recruit a
local membership base might give legislators more of an independent mandate in Parliament and
hence undermine central party power
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- as noted, party leaders have almost never denied party
status to a local candidate. Yet there are few if any examples of rogue MPs challenging their
leaders while safely supported by a strong constituency base. Instead, volatile membership may
keep the party centralized and disciplined.
Similarly, the need to recruit masses of supporters may contribute to ideological dilution,
since nomination contests revolve less around ideology than organizational skill.
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MPs may be
less unified by ideology than by their ability to sign up living, breathing supporters of any stripe.
Furthermore, the low incentives for long-term membership and inability to influence policy
meaningfully means MPs and party leaders are rarely held to account by the larger membership
for their ideological choices. Without stronger mechanisms for grassroots involvement, it is
unlikely that fluid memberships contribute to ideological solidarity and cohesion in parties.
Convention