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Cabinet Partisanship and Regime Type in Contemporary Democracies
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Cabinet Partisanship and Regime Type
in Contemporary Democracies
Octavio Amorim Neto
Graduate School of Economics
Getulio Vargas Foundation
Praia de Botafogo 190 sala 820
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22253-900
Brazil
E-mail: ## email not listed ##
David Samuels
University of Minnesota
Department of Political Science
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455
E-mail: ## email not listed ##
Abstract
This paper provides a simple theory to understand the relative incentives chief executives face to appoint partisans or non-partisans to cabinet ministries. In systems where the chief executive depends on a legislative majority for policy success, the chief executive must appoint partisans to the cabinet. In systems where the chief executive possesses independent powers and thus depends relatively less on a legislative majority for policy success, the chief executive has a wider range of cabinet appointment options available. We explore cabinet dynamics across all regime types: parliamentary monarchies and republics, semi-presidential systems, and presidential regimes. Our dependent variable is the share of non-partisans in the cabinet, and the key independent variable is the system of government (later iterations of this paper will add cabinet coalescence as a dependent variable). The four types of political regimes can be arrayed along a continuum from weakest to strongest head of state - from ceremonial monarchs to powerful presidents. As the head of state becomes stronger, he or she will possess greater autonomous powers – to appoint and dismiss ministers and bureaucrats, and to decree laws or other regulations – to make policy unilaterally. The more extensive are such powers, the lower partisanship in the cabinet. Our empirical analysis of 437 cabinets in 57 countries strongly confirms this argument. Our findings reveal that institutional format substantially differentiates the degree of partisanship in governments around the world. We then discuss how these differences are critical for understanding executive-legislative relations under different constitutional structures.
Prepared for presentation at the 2003 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.We thank Juliana Estrella, Marina Vivas, and Lourenço Senne for research assistance, and David Altman, John Carey, Antônio Octávio Cintra, Luciano Dias, Eduardo Dockendorff, Maria Escobar-Lemmon, Eduardo Gamarra, Barbara Geddes, Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert, Lisa Hilbink, Daniel Kaufman, Fabrice Lehoucq, Arend Lijphart, Flavio Machicado, René Mayorga, Ana Maria Mustapic, Patricio Navia, Dieter Nohlen, Antonio Ortiz Mena, Monica Pachón, Judith Schultz, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson for providing data.
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| | Authors: Amorim Neto, Octavio. and Samuels, David. |
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Cabinet Partisanship and Regime Type
in Contemporary Democracies
Octavio Amorim Neto
Graduate School of Economics
Getulio Vargas Foundation
Praia de Botafogo 190 sala 820
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22253-900
Brazil
E-mail: ## email not listed ##
David Samuels
University of Minnesota
Department of Political Science
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455
E-mail: ## email not listed ##
Abstract
This paper provides a simple theory to understand the relative incentives chief executives face to appoint partisans
or non-partisans to cabinet ministries. In systems where the chief executive depends on a legislative majority for
policy success, the chief executive must appoint partisans to the cabinet. In systems where the chief executive
possesses independent powers and thus depends relatively less on a legislative majority for policy success, the chief
executive has a wider range of cabinet appointment options available. We explore cabinet dynamics across all
regime types: parliamentary monarchies and republics, semi-presidential systems, and presidential regimes. Our
dependent variable is the share of non-partisans in the cabinet, and the key independent variable is the system of
government (later iterations of this paper will add cabinet coalescence as a dependent variable). The four types of
political regimes can be arrayed along a continuum from weakest to strongest head of state - from ceremonial
monarchs to powerful presidents. As the head of state becomes stronger, he or she will possess greater autonomous
powers – to appoint and dismiss ministers and bureaucrats, and to decree laws or other regulations – to make policy
unilaterally. The more extensive are such powers, the lower partisanship in the cabinet. Our empirical analysis of
437 cabinets in 57 countries strongly confirms this argument. Our findings reveal that institutional format
substantially differentiates the degree of partisanship in governments around the world. We then discuss how these
differences are critical for understanding executive-legislative relations under different constitutional structures.
Prepared for presentation at the 2003 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
We thank Juliana Estrella, Marina Vivas, and Lourenço Senne for research assistance, and David Altman, John
Carey, Antônio Octávio Cintra, Luciano Dias, Eduardo Dockendorff, Maria Escobar-Lemmon, Eduardo Gamarra,
Barbara Geddes, Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert, Lisa Hilbink, Daniel Kaufman, Fabrice Lehoucq, Arend Lijphart, Flavio
Machicado, René Mayorga, Ana Maria Mustapic, Patricio Navia, Dieter Nohlen, Antonio Ortiz Mena, Monica
Pachón, Judith Schultz, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson for providing data.
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