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Partisan Realignment in the South and Its Impact on the Legislative Process,
Some Preliminary Observations
Introduction
In 1995, the Republican Party in Congress completely overhauled legislative
procedures after gaining control of the U.S. House of Representatives for the first time
in over 40 years (see Maltzman 1998). By and large, the changes orchestrated by Newt
Gingrich consolidated the power and strength of the office of Speaker. Other changes
included the elimination of three committees and 25 subcommittees, the cutting of
committee staff size by a third, and limiting chairmen to three terms of service and the
Speaker to eight. In addition, the simultaneous joint referral of legislation to multiple
committees was no longer allowed. Many of these rules changes were motivated by a
desire to “get back” at a Democratic party that Republicans felt had oppressed them
both structurally and procedurally during the previous 40 years.
Consider the recent situation in the United States Senate. In 2001, when Jim
Jeffords (I-VT) changed his affiliation from Republican to an Independent voting with
Democrats creating a 50-50 split in the chamber, the organizational arrangements of the
chamber changed. For example, each party was given 50% of committee staff funding,
whereas previously the majority party received two-thirds of the funding and the minority
party one-third. In 2003, with the new split being 51-48-1 in the favor of the Republican
Party, the Republicans wanted to go back to the old funding system ratio, but the
Democrats wanted the funding to remain at the 50-50 level, and a heated organizational
battle was engaged (Asher 2003).
The purpose of these examples is to illustrate the importance that partisanship
plays in the legislative process. In particular, these examples suggest that despite the
Convention