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One President, Two Presidencies: George W. Bush in Peace and War
Peri E. Arnold
Abstract
Was George W. Bush’s performance in office after September 11, 2001 a reflection
of his sudden maturation in crisis? Or, was the widely observed change in his performance
related to the institution of the presidency itself? This paper takes the early Bush presidency
as a natural experiment in the institutional presidency’s effects. The case reveals two quite
different dimensions of the president’s authority and symbolic meaning. The Bush case is
examined through the conceptual lens of two institutional presidencies, a conventional
presidency and a war presidency (distinguishing this conception from the “two presidencies”
research tradition in president-Congress research). Within the conventional presidency, Bush
was limited by his questionable legitimacy and less than compelling style of communication
but strengthened by the Republican (albeit narrow) hold on Congress and the party’s
ideological homogeneity. After the terrorist attacks, Bush’s reliance on the institutional
authority and resources of the war presidency changed his leadership, his presidency’s
symbolic meaning for Americans, and the degree of his control over the executive branch.
The paper examines Bush’s use of the war presidency and concludes with a discussion of the
advantages lent to the incumbent in domestic politics by his role as war president.
An unlikely combination of events formed George W. Bush’s presidency. He lost the
2000 popular election but was declared winner by the U.S. Supreme Court. Despite that
inauspicious entry to office, Bush was legislatively successful with his two main campaign
promises, a tax cut and education reform. Then eight months after entering office, Bush became
a war president.
George W. Bush has enjoyed an unprecedented pattern of popular approval over the
course of his first term. Beginning with dubious legitimacy and no mandate, he has centralized
the executive branch, launched substantial changes in economic and domestic policy, and
refashioned U.S. foreign policy. As other chapters in this volume show (Price and Coleman;
Rae), Bush’s success in office is related to the Republican party’s resurgent strength, its unity,
and the president’s harmonious relationship with his party’s conservative base. Despite an evenly
divided electorate, the Republican party has the advantage of strong ideological consensus,
Convention