3
control (albeit narrow) of both houses of Congress, and a structural advantage in the electoral
college, based in the overrepresentation of small population states. However, as this chapter will
show, to fully understand George W. Bush’s leadership we must examine his use of the
presidency’s institutional resources and possibilities.
Our premise is that President Bush has occupied, in effect, two different presidencies.
The first was the conventional office, constrained by checks and balances. And within that
conventional role, Bush held a questionable legitimacy, lacked the ability to claim an obvious
mandate, and depended heavily on his partisan advantages. The second role is the war
presidency. It is armed with great unilateral powers, possesses a high degree of legitimacy,
claiming what John Pitney elsewhere in this volume calls a “khaki mandate, and demands
bipartisan support. After defining the differences between these two faces of the presidency, this
chapter will contrast George W. Bush’s performance in the conventional office with his
expansive use of the war presidency. Finally, we shall consider the relevance of the war
presidency to President Bush’s 2004 reelection effort.
1
Incumbent, Institution, and Context
The president is an incumbent within an institution that is wrapped in a political context.
George W. Bush brings to the office his style, skills, partisanship and ambition. But he is
constrained by the possibilities available to him within the office. The office contains authority,
organization, symbolic meaning, and potential for power. The political scientist Hugh Heclo says
of the presidency that it shapes what incumbents do in office: “In terms of its deep structure . . .
the office is largely a given . . .. The total effect is to program the modern president” (24-5).
Additionally, we must see that the issue and political contexts in which the president works
Convention