9
Some of Perot’s methods, such as paid ads exhorting the candidates to address the
consensus, can easily be adopted by the ACF. But others are less perfect fits, and require
adjustment. For example Perot, who after withdrawing returned to the 1992 race as a
candidate, issued his own detailed proposal. The ACF, which endorses no candidate or
proposal until after the voters have spoken, will instead publicize the model Democratic and
Republican plans developed during its issue study phase and will then publicly challenge the
candidates during the fall campaign to embrace them or justify a refusal to do so.
In cases where polls show a clear voter preference for one model partisan plan over
another, the disadvantaged candidate would be expected to do what all office-seekers in
such circumstances do: tailor a proposal to increase its attractiveness (see Scenario 1 below).
The concern of the ACF is only to ensure that any modification a candidate makes to a
model partisan plan remains a realistic approach to solving the problem and is
straightforward about the costs and who will bear them.
This proved to be an issue in the case of Perot and the deficit. The Texas billionaire
did get the major party candidates to pay more attention to the deficit. But he did not
succeed in forcing them to present truly serious deficit reduction plans (Murray, September
15, 1992: A1). That outcome suggests that his leverage techniques were, from the ACF
perspective, insufficient. To them can be added additional weaponry from the standard bag
of campaign tricks. ACF will retain the services of the best available political consultants to
devise attack ads and other pressure tactics aimed at forcing reluctant candidates to offer
detailed plans.
Fourth among the necessary ACF capabilities is to promote a sustained campaign
debate over alternative partisan solutions to target problems. Once the size and intensity
of pre-existing public agreement on the top priority problem has reached its potential and
assuming that the candidates have put forward acceptable plans, the problem becomes
keeping the issue on the front-burner during the campaign.
Candidates, who are issue-opportunists, will experiment with a variety of topics in
search of a competitive edge. The ACF cannot prevent that, but it can put intense pressure
on the major candidates to keep the target issue in reasonable focus throughout the
campaign. The pressure can involve both carrots (e.g., free TV time to debate or present on
the issue) and sticks (attack advertising and other efforts to stigmatize any candidate who
too long ignores the top policy debate). But the key point is that the pressure must be
sustained, particularly during the three-month period from Labor Day to Election Day.
This is an extraordinarily challenging task, because campaigns are famous for
surprise twists and turns that can change the subject forever in an instant.
Consider just a few examples. Within a month of his 1841 inauguration as president
William Henry Harrison died, radically altering the post-election policy agenda (Crockett,
2002: 62). In 1956 foreign policy crises erupted just weeks before Election Day,
fundamentally changing the issue priorities of candidates Eisenhower and Stevenson and the
voters trying to decide between them. And in both 1976 and 2000 debate performances by
Convention