Author's Keywords: approval voting; elections; Condorcet winner/loser; Nash equilibrium	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64837_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Brams, Steven. and Sanver, Remzi. "Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64837_index.html>

Brams, S. J. and Sanver, R. , 2003-08-27 "Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64837_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Voters are sovereign to the degree that they can express their approval for any set of candidates and, by so doing, help elect or prevent the election of candidates. While voter sovereignty is maximized under approval voting (AV), AV can lead to � a plethora of outcomes, depending on where voters draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable candidates; and � Condorcet losers and other lesser candidates, even in equilibrium. But we argue that voters� judgments about candidate acceptability should take precedence over standard social-choice criteria, such as electing a Condorcet or Borda winner. Among other things, we show that � sincere outcomes under all voting systems considered are AV outcomes, but not vice versa; � a Condorcet winner�s election under AV is always a strong Nash-equilibrium outcome but not under other systems, including those that guarantee the election of Condorcet winners if voters are sincere.

Ranked-Choice Voting in San Francisco: The Ease of Electoral Reform to an Alternative Voting System

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