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Campaign Contributions, Informative Lobbying and Agenda Setters
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Campaign Contributions and Lobbying for Agendas
Daniel E. BerganNorthwestern University
Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28 - August 31, 2003. Copyright by the American Political Science Association
Abstract
Interest groups lobby members of Congress not only to influence votes, but also to influence the agenda (e.g. Wright 1996). Previous game theoretic models have suggested that interest groups make campaign contributions to signal the benefits of a policy to an agenda setter (Austen-Smith 1990, 1993 Austen-Smith and Wright 1994). Other models have considered the possibility that interest groups bribe agenda setters and voters with campaign contributions (Dharmapala 1999, Helpman and Persson 1998). In the current model I suggest that interest groups make campaign contributions to agenda setters in order to signal the policy preference of voters who must approve of a proposal for it to be enacted. I find that campaign contributions, although not essential to signaling the policy preferences of voters, may allow interest groups to make more precise signals to agenda setters. In addition, agenda setters may grant access to interest groups that make no campaign contribution at all.
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Campaign Contributions and Lobbying for Agendas
Daniel E. Bergan
Northwestern University
Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, August 28 - August 31, 2003.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association
Abstract
Interest groups lobby members of Congress not only to influence votes, but also to
influence the agenda (e.g. Wright 1996). Previous game theoretic models have suggested
that interest groups make campaign contributions to signal the benefits of a policy to an
agenda setter (Austen-Smith 1990, 1993 Austen-Smith and Wright 1994). Other models
have considered the possibility that interest groups bribe agenda setters and voters with
campaign contributions (Dharmapala 1999, Helpman and Persson 1998). In the current
model I suggest that interest groups make campaign contributions to agenda setters in
order to signal the policy preference of voters who must approve of a proposal for it to be
enacted. I find that campaign contributions, although not essential to signaling the policy
preferences of voters, may allow interest groups to make more precise signals to agenda
setters. In addition, agenda setters may grant access to interest groups that make no
campaign contribution at all.
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