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THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION. How the Senate and President Affect the Balance of Power in the House |
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Abstract:
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Do the President or the Senate affect the balance of power in the House? We answer “Yes.” We base our answer on a non-cooperative, multi-stage, and multi-dimensional game-theoretic model that shows how constitutional requirements to build lawmaking coalitions with the Senate and President affect bargaining dynamics in the House. We use the model to prove that shifting the ideal point of a single non-House actor, while holding constant the ideal point of all House members, can radically alter the balance of power within the House. We also provide a different explanation of why preference outliers hold privileged positions in the House. In sum, constitutional requirements to bargain with non-House actors can induce House members to make different organizational decisions than they would if they were, as commonly represented, an isolated entity that is unaware of other chambers or branches of government. |
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f1 (255), f2 (255), q (255), cb (255), f3 (255), 2 (225), offer (220), hous (217), faction (156), senat (149), p (105), 0 (104), confere (101), confer (100), bill (96), accept (94), z (92), presid (86), member (79), point (75), q-f1 (69), |
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Association:
Name: American Political Science Association
URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Sin, Gisela. and Lupia, Arthur. "THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION. How the Senate and President Affect the Balance of Power in the House" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64858_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Sin, G. and Lupia, A. , 2003-08-27 "THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION. How the Senate and President Affect the Balance of Power in the House" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64858_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Do the President or the Senate affect the balance of power in the House? We answer “Yes.” We base our answer on a non-cooperative, multi-stage, and multi-dimensional game-theoretic model that shows how constitutional requirements to build lawmaking coalitions with the Senate and President affect bargaining dynamics in the House. We use the model to prove that shifting the ideal point of a single non-House actor, while holding constant the ideal point of all House members, can radically alter the balance of power within the House. We also provide a different explanation of why preference outliers hold privileged positions in the House. In sum, constitutional requirements to bargain with non-House actors can induce House members to make different organizational decisions than they would if they were, as commonly represented, an isolated entity that is unaware of other chambers or branches of government. |
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| Document Type: |
.pdf |
| Page count: |
42 |
| Word count: |
13322 |
| Text sample: |
| THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION How the Senate and President Affect the Balance of Power in the House GISELA SIN ARTHUR LUPIA University of Michigan PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE. Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Philadelphia August 28-31 2003. We thank Jesse Menning for writing programs that allowed us to verify the accuracy of our equilibrium statement and to generate numerical examples and images. We thank Rosario Aguilar-Pariente Orit Kedar and Justin Magouirk for |
| factions Senate reject q 50% accept reject q House factions reject q Figure 3 Figure 4 The Senate and President have the same ideal point. The Senate moves to Faction w’s ideal point. The Legislative outcome is circled cb(z s=p). The Legislative outcome is circled cb(z s=w). Figure 5 All else constant faction z achieves greater policy utility by having a member of faction w serve as House conferee. Figure 6 |
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