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A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union

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Abstract:

This article builds on formal U.S. and EU works on the politics of delegation by incorporating EU-specific features: the legislative and executive role of the Commission, the legislative and executive role of the members of the Council of Ministers, the fact that many European policies are executed by the different national administrations, and the variety of decision rules for the adoption of EU law. The model produces three main findings: 1) in case of unanimity and a new law, member states agree to restrain their own national administrations at only an intermediate level of policy conflict within the Council and the equilibrium level of national discretion first decreases then increases as policy conflict within the Council increases, 2) compared to unanimity, majority voting facilitates the adoption of legislation that restrains national authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to a supranational Commission and increases the discretion of a supranational Commission, 3) in codecision, a supranational Parliament with preferences similar to those of the Commission reinforces the dynamics of majority voting, a national Parliament may lead to an inversion of this dynamics.
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legisl (33), polici (33), nation (27), european (21), execut (21), commiss (19), administr (15), deleg (15), institut (15), council (15), union (14), eu (13), model (13), discret (12), member (12), vote (11), power (11), unanim (10), adopt (9), prefer (9), major (9),

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Keywords: European Union, European Commission, national administrations, delegation, execution, decision rules
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Name: American Political Science Association
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MLA Citation:

Franchino, Fabio. "A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65101_index.html>

APA Citation:

Franchino, F. , 2002-08-28 "A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65101_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This article builds on formal U.S. and EU works on the politics of delegation by incorporating EU-specific features: the legislative and executive role of the Commission, the legislative and executive role of the members of the Council of Ministers, the fact that many European policies are executed by the different national administrations, and the variety of decision rules for the adoption of EU law. The model produces three main findings: 1) in case of unanimity and a new law, member states agree to restrain their own national administrations at only an intermediate level of policy conflict within the Council and the equilibrium level of national discretion first decreases then increases as policy conflict within the Council increases, 2) compared to unanimity, majority voting facilitates the adoption of legislation that restrains national authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to a supranational Commission and increases the discretion of a supranational Commission, 3) in codecision, a supranational Parliament with preferences similar to those of the Commission reinforces the dynamics of majority voting, a national Parliament may lead to an inversion of this dynamics.
Check author's web site for an updated version of the paper.

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Associated Document Available American Political Science Association
Associated Document Available Political Research Online

Document Type: .pdf
Page count: 47
Word count: 1959
Text sample:
A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union * Fabio Franchino School of Public Policy University College London 29/30 Tavistock Square London WC1H 9QU United Kingdom Email: f.franchino@ucl.ac.uk Website: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/people/fabio_franchino.php Paper presented at the panel on Presidential Structures and Power of the 2002 APSA Meeting August 29 ­ September 1 Boston. Abstract: This article builds on formal U.S. and EU works on the politics of delegation by incorporating EU­specific features: the legislative and executive role of the Commission
of decision rules. We consider three legislative procedures: when the Council acts alone and decides by either qualified majority 5 or unanimous voting and when it codecides with the European Parliament. 5 In this procedure the votes of the member states are weighted. The approval of a measure requires approximately five­ seventh of these votes. Moreover the Council can amend unanimously a proposal of the Commission. 6
There are six players in the game. The


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