Author's Keywords: Keywords: altruism, freerider problem, population uncertainty, Bayesian equilibrium	Convention All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65109_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Jankowski, Richard. and Rogers, Robert. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Towards a Unified Theory of Collective Action" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65109_index.html>

Jankowski, R. and Rogers, R. , 2002-08-28 "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Towards a Unified Theory of Collective Action" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65109_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Mancur Olson in "The Logic of Collective Action" presents an analysis of the freerider problem faced by groups that provide a public good. His analysis is explicitly limited to the collective action problem in economic interest groups, such as unions and business associations. Olson specifically notes that his analysis does not apply to philanthropic organizations. In recent years, Walker (1991) and others have documented a substantial growth in what are called public interest groups, such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Common Cause. These public interest groups are examples of Olson's philanthropic groups because their goal is helping others or society in general, rather than solely benefitting the members of the group. We propose an explanation of how public interest groups solve their collective action problem by incorporating two features not found in Olson's analysis. First, the public good provided by these groups is non-rival rather than rival as in the case of economic interest groups. Second, we modify the underlying rational, self-interested axiom by introducing a modicum of altruism. Specifically, we show that pure altruism is required rather than a warm-glow or a morally based notion of altruism.

The Voluntary Provision of "Bi-Public Goods": Public Interest Groups and the Collective Action Problem, Theory and Tests

The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Public Interest Groups and the Collective Action Problem: Theory and Evidence