Author's Keywords: Keywords: trade, dispute, market, access, WTO, World Trade Organization, expected utility theory, prospect theory	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65142_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Elms, Deborah. "Large Costs, Small Benefits: Explaining Trade Dispute Outcomes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2009-05-27 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65142_index.html>

Elms, D. K. , 2002-08-28 "Large Costs, Small Benefits: Explaining Trade Dispute Outcomes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-27 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65142_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Why do states often expend considerable cost, time and effort trying to resolve disputes with only limited potential benefits? The United States frequently engages in negotiations with its trading partners over expanded market access for American firms. Many of these negotiations involve markets worth millions or even billions of dollars. But occasionally, government officials bargain long and hard over issues that were never predicted to result in substantial benefits. For example, the United States held negotiations with Japan for more than 30 years over increased market access for American apples. These negotiations were ultimately carried to the highest levels of government, discussed at international conferences, and even ruled on by World Trade Organization (WTO), yet the potential market for foreign apples was never estimated at greater than $15 million. Such protracted negotiations in this sector do not make sense from the perspective of expected utility theory. This outcome is understandable, however, with a focus on the role of losses drawn from prospect theory. Apple negotiations came to represent a spiral model for both the United States and Japan. As both sides of the dispute viewed their own losses as deepening over the course of negotiations, the actors became increasingly willing to take risky actions in an attempt to recoup losses.

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Legislative rule review, partisan control, and the costs of regulation: the case of pollution control in the American states.