Author's Keywords: Keywords: proportional representation, single-member districts, election rules, welfare policy, welfare bias, welfare preferences, electing right governments	Convention Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65263_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Powell, Bingham. "PR, the Median Voter and Economic Policy: An Exploration" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65263_index.html>

Powell, B. G. , 2002-08-28 "PR, the Median Voter and Economic Policy: An Exploration" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65263_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Empirical studies show that in modern societies political systems with multi-member PR electoral rules tend to have larger governments, more welfare spending, and more equality in income distribution than systems with single-member district (SMD) election rules. If the two types of systems have voters with similar preferences, these economic policies and outcomes would imply that voters in PR systems have more ?welfare? than the median citizen prefers, or that voters in SMD systems receive less ?welfare? than the median prefers, or both. An empirical investigation of cross-national survey results suggests that although citizens in the two kinds of systems have similar left-right self-placements, the medians seem substantively more welfare-oriented in the PR systems. The causal status of preference and policy is not determined. Investigation of the competitive discourse in the two types of systems shows on average rather similar party alternatives confronting voters in each. Analysis of government formation, however, suggests that left governments are somewhat encouraged under PR, but substantially disadvantaged under SMD. It is unclear if the welfare bias in the preferences of citizens is sufficient to account for the bias in electoral systems? creation of leftist governments and policies, or if party coordination problems contribute.

The Declining Significance of Left Parties? Party Positioning and Welfare Policy

Anxiety, Party Identification, and the Vote: Understanding the Dynamics of Citizen Preferences in Dutch Politics

Media effects on the vote for governing parties: The role of media bias and fluidity of the political context across European countries