Author's Keywords: Keywords: globalization, convergence, industrial policy, varieties of capitalism, party discipline, federalism	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65414_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Kramer, Claire. "?Particularistic? Liberalism: Industries, Institutions and Influence in Liberal Market Economies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65414_index.html>

Kramer, C. , 2002-08-28 "?Particularistic? Liberalism: Industries, Institutions and Influence in Liberal Market Economies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65414_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Globalization?s onset inspired predictions about convergence of diverse capitalist economies to American-style liberalism (Kurzer 1994; Frieden & Rogowski 1996). Even dissenters (Garrett 1998; Boix 1998; Hall & Soskice 2001; Kitschelt, Lange, Marks & Stephens 1999), who insisted on the persistence of different capitalist models, agreed on liberalism?s comparative advantages: fewer regulations, less particularistic policy-making, and swift asset redeployment. Rather than inspiring hands-off government, however, increased international competition has often been accompanied by industry-specific tax cuts and credits, subsidies, and import relief. Neither the convergence school nor its critics, can explain when and why the liberal market economies (LMEs) in the UK, US, and Canada stray from laissez-faire. This paper argues that political institutions explain divergence among LMEs. My argument is that the key variable distinguishing between the UK and US is the weakness of party discipline in the United States and its strong presence in the UK. The most important distinction in scholarly work, by contrast, has been between majoritarianism and proportional representation electoral systems (Rogowski 1987). Political party discipline influences politicians? incentives to adopt universalistic versus particularistic policies toward business in the aggregate, as well as policies regarding specific sectors. The policy result of weak party discipline is different from the result of federalism. In systems with weak party discipline, businesses can invest in particular favors from individual legislators. In federal systems, by contrast, the only industrial particularism is inter-state bids for mobile industries capable of making credible exit threats.

Whither the Internationalist Coalition in American Foreign Policy? The Domestic Politics of International Trade and Foreign Aid Policy, 1980-2006

Divided Government, Parties, and U.S. Trade Policy: How Domestic Institutions and Partisan Control Affect Trade Policy, 1947-2002