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Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions: Developing a Supply-Side Logic |
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Abstract:
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In this paper we identify Authoritative International Institutions (AIIs), to which states have yielded slices of their sovereignty. AIIs can make decisions that legally bind domestic governments on specified issues even without those governments' consent. Previous theories of international institutions, including those found within liberal rationalism, constructivism, and historical institutionalism, cannot account for the wide variance in the amount of sovereignty yielded to AIIs. We argue that this deficiency stems from an overly narrow focus on state demand for international institutions that neglects the supply side. Two supply-side factors-previously existing institutions and systemic shocks-can supplement demand-side explanations to better account for sovereignty yielded to AIIs. We demonstrate the importance of including supply-side variables by applying the argument to 16 cases in monetary cooperation, EU expansion, human rights and the environment. We find evidence that supply-side factors increase the probability of states yielding sovereignty to AIIs, though it is also the case that states sometimes do not act on available supply. |
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environment (151), loan (96), vote (87), io (80), princip (73), bank (71), intern (65), interest (65), state (63), countri (56), world (51), variabl (48), share (46), organ (46), institut (45), member (45), polici (44), year (44), agenc (44), relat (42), agent (38), |
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Keywords: sovereignty, international organizations, human rights, monetary cooperation, European Union, environment |
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Association:
Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Jacoby, Wade., Nielson, Daniel., Cooper, Scott. and Hawkins, Darren. "Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions: Developing a Supply-Side Logic" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65550_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Jacoby, W. , Nielson, D. , Cooper, S. and Hawkins, D. , 2002-08-28 "Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions: Developing a Supply-Side Logic" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65550_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: In this paper we identify Authoritative International Institutions (AIIs), to which states have yielded slices of their sovereignty. AIIs can make decisions that legally bind domestic governments on specified issues even without those governments' consent. Previous theories of international institutions, including those found within liberal rationalism, constructivism, and historical institutionalism, cannot account for the wide variance in the amount of sovereignty yielded to AIIs. We argue that this deficiency stems from an overly narrow focus on state demand for international institutions that neglects the supply side. Two supply-side factors-previously existing institutions and systemic shocks-can supplement demand-side explanations to better account for sovereignty yielded to AIIs. We demonstrate the importance of including supply-side variables by applying the argument to 16 cases in monetary cooperation, EU expansion, human rights and the environment. We find evidence that supply-side factors increase the probability of states yielding sovereignty to AIIs, though it is also the case that states sometimes do not act on available supply. |
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| Document Type: |
.pdf |
| Page count: |
27 |
| Word count: |
11715 |
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| Principals and Interests: Agency Theory and Multilateral Development Bank Lending Daniel L. Nielson Brigham Young University daniel_nielson@byu.edu Michael J. Tierney College of William and Mary mjtier@wm.edu Prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association meeting Boston MA August 2002. Abstract Current international relations theory cannot accommodate both the autonomy that international organizations (IOs) often exhibit and the influence of member states on IO behavior. Drawing from microeconomics and theories of American politics we offer an agency theory of |
| them with zscores. The difference with the time series was that we used the 97.5 threshold the 2.5 percentile value the mean and the standard deviation from the 1996 baseline in computing the z scores for each variable. Again following the ESI procedure for all country years we then averaged the variables' z scores constituting each indicator. Next we averaged all of the indicators for each country year. Finally we computed the overall percentile rank for each country year. |
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