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Bargaining While Fighting

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Abstract:

Recent work on the origins and causes of war highlights two issues. First, formal and nonformal analyses see uncertainty as a fundamental cause. But the latter typically emphasizes uncertainty over the distribution of power whereas the former focuses on uncertainty over the costs of fighting. Second, most formal studies model going to war as a game-ending move. These issues pose important questions: Do the conclusions derived from formal analyses with uncertainty over costs hold with uncertainty about the distribution of power? Is modeling war as a game-ending move a "neutral" simplification or does it yield misleading results? And, even if neutral, can this simplification be relaxed to illuminate intra-war bargaining?
This analysis models conflict as a costly process during which the states continue to bargain and may be uncertain of the costs about fighting or the distribution of power. The game-ending-move assumption is generally neutral. The dynamics of intra-war bargaining are broadly similar regardless of the source of uncertainty -- the bargaining is a screening process -- but important differences arise when states can make offers more rapidly than they can fight battles.

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e (255), d (255), r (255), x (255), 1 (255), 0 (255), n (255), o (228), er (199), state (176), y (152), +1 (140), k (134), cost (128), ghting (122), q (102), p (92), game (91), ed (85), distribut (74), b (72),

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Keywords: bargaining, war
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Name: American Political Science Association
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Powell, Robert. "Bargaining While Fighting" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65669_index.html>

APA Citation:

Powell, R. , 2002-08-28 "Bargaining While Fighting" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65669_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Recent work on the origins and causes of war highlights two issues. First, formal and nonformal analyses see uncertainty as a fundamental cause. But the latter typically emphasizes uncertainty over the distribution of power whereas the former focuses on uncertainty over the costs of fighting. Second, most formal studies model going to war as a game-ending move. These issues pose important questions: Do the conclusions derived from formal analyses with uncertainty over costs hold with uncertainty about the distribution of power? Is modeling war as a game-ending move a "neutral" simplification or does it yield misleading results? And, even if neutral, can this simplification be relaxed to illuminate intra-war bargaining?
This analysis models conflict as a costly process during which the states continue to bargain and may be uncertain of the costs about fighting or the distribution of power. The game-ending-move assumption is generally neutral. The dynamics of intra-war bargaining are broadly similar regardless of the source of uncertainty -- the bargaining is a screening process -- but important differences arise when states can make offers more rapidly than they can fight battles.

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Document Type: .pdf
Page count: 53
Word count: 27032
Text sample:
Bargaining While Fighting* Robert Powell October 2001 Department of Political Science 210 Barrows Hall 1950 University of California Berkeley CA 94720-1950 *I am grateful to Leo Simon for many helpful comments and criticisms. This work was assisted by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-9911075). Bargaining While Fighting Abstract Recent work on the origins and causes of war highlights two issues. First formal and nonformal analyses see uncertainty as a fundamental cause. But the latter typically emphasizes uncertainty
Kenneth. 1999. “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform ” International Organization 53:23-66. Schultz Kenneth. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Schwiezer Urs. 1989. “Litigation and Settlement Under Two-Sided Incomplete Informa- tion ” Review of Economic Studies 18:163-78. Smith Alastair. 1998a. “Fighting Battles Winning Wars ” Journal of Conßict Resolu- tion 42:301-320. Smith Alastair. 1998b. “International Crises and Domestic Politics ” American Political Science Review 92:623-638 Smith Alastair and Alan Stam. 2001. “Bargaining through Conßict.” Unpublished


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