Author's Keywords: Keywords: diversionary theory, international conflict, game theory, two-level games	Convention Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65687_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Gent, Stephen. "Scapegoating Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Theory of War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65687_index.html>

Gent, S. E. , 2002-08-28 "Scapegoating Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Theory of War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65687_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Proponents of the diversionary theory of war have often argued that domestic reselection incentives induce office-seeking leaders to pursue aggressive foreign policies. Previous formal models of diversionary theory, however, have ignored the critical role that strategic interaction plays in foreign policy decision-making. This article addresses this problem by developing a two-state, two-sided incomplete information deterrence model with domestic reselection. According to the model, reselection mechanisms increase a leader?s propensity to pursue aggressive foreign policies. Diversionary incentives in attacking states lead to an increase in war outcomes, while diversionary incentives in defending states may or may not increase the probability of war. The model also predicts that there will be nonmonotonic relationships between economic performance and war and between regime type and diversionary behavior, which may explain the discrepancies among many empirical tests of diversionary theory.

?States Aren?t People Too?: State Agency, State Theory and the Making of ?Ethical? Foreign Policy

State Political Beliefs and Economic Resources in Setting State Medicaid Hospital Reimbursement Policy