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Economic Performance of |
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Abstract:
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Comparative political economists have conventionally claimed that the strength and stability of governments affect policy making and performance, and that "weak" governments--multiparty, minority, and short-lived--how poorer economic performance. This paper tests this and related hypotheses on deficits, economic growth, unemployment, and inflation by examining data from 17 OECD countries. We find that there is generally little evidence to indicate that weak governments, when considered independently, produce poorer performance than strong ones. But the effects of different government types are partly conditional on the central bank and labor organization. When the central bank is strong, coalition governments exhibit better inflation and economic growth performance than one-party governments, but the opposite happens when the central bank is weak. Tentative explanations for these relationships are attempted. We also find that a strong central bank, generally, leads to higher inflation and lower growth. This suggests that some of the benefits of central bank independence may be context-specific, depending on other political-economic factors. |
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govern (255), econom (163), parti (143), central (141), labor (141), bank (131), polici (129), effect (119), weak (109), strong (86), coalit (83), perform (81), inflat (80), unemploy (77), growth (77), minor (58), polit (57), one (54), signific (52), condit (49), 3 (46), |
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Keywords: economic performance, institutions, government types, economic policy, central bank, coalition governments, comparative political economy, advanced industrialized countries, economic growth, unemployment, inflation |
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Association:
Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Sakamoto, Takayuki. "Economic Performance of" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2002 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p66532_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Sakamoto, T. , 2002-08-28 "Economic Performance of" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p66532_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Comparative political economists have conventionally claimed that the strength and stability of governments affect policy making and performance, and that "weak" governments--multiparty, minority, and short-lived--how poorer economic performance. This paper tests this and related hypotheses on deficits, economic growth, unemployment, and inflation by examining data from 17 OECD countries. We find that there is generally little evidence to indicate that weak governments, when considered independently, produce poorer performance than strong ones. But the effects of different government types are partly conditional on the central bank and labor organization. When the central bank is strong, coalition governments exhibit better inflation and economic growth performance than one-party governments, but the opposite happens when the central bank is weak. Tentative explanations for these relationships are attempted. We also find that a strong central bank, generally, leads to higher inflation and lower growth. This suggests that some of the benefits of central bank independence may be context-specific, depending on other political-economic factors. |
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| Document Type: |
.pdf |
| Page count: |
46 |
| Word count: |
11770 |
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| Economic Performance of ``Weak'' Governments and Their Interaction with the Central Bank and Labor: Deficits Economic Growth Unemployment and Inflation 19611998 Takayuki Sakamoto Department of Political Science Southern Methodist University P.O. Box 750117 Dallas TX 752750117 Phone: 2147682521 Fax: 2147683469 Email: sakamoto@mail.smu.edu Abstract Comparative political economists have conventionally claimed that the strength and stability of governments affect policy making and performance and that ``weak governments''---multiparty minority and short lived---show poorer economic performance. This paper tests this and related hypotheses |
| 3party governments Weak labor 0.36 0.73* 1.10* (Labor=0.05) (0.24) (0.43) (0.62) Strong labor 0.11 0.07 0.02 (Labor=0.9) (1.53) (1.44) (1.38) Note: Conditional coefficients with conditional standard errors in parentheses. *p<.10. Figure 6. Conditional Effects of the Number of Parties the Central Bank and Labor on Inflation Strong central bank Weak central bank (CBI=0.7) (CBI=0.1) 3party governments 3party governments 6.12** 1.41 Strong labor (2.91) (1.67) (Labor=1) 1party governments 1party governments 6.08** 1.46 (2.98) (1.77) 3party governments 3party governments 0.24 2.11 |
Similar Titles:
Coalition governments, social insurance and central bank independence versus inflation: fighting inflation alone or together?
Politics, Institutions, and Economic Policy Paradigms: The Global Spread of Central Bank Independence
Who or What Governs: A Comparison of Economic, Political, Institutional, and Bureaucratic Effects on Urban Governance
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