Abstract
In this paper we identify Authoritative International Institutions (AIIs), to which states have
yielded slices of their sovereignty. AIIs can make decisions that legally bind domestic
governments on specified issues even without those governments’ consent. Over the past 20
years, scholars have viewed the evolution of international institutions largely through the lens of
state motives. We argue that it is time to think more systematically about the role of the structure
of the international system. Two structural factors—previously existing institutions and the
presence of systemic shocks—can complement theories of actor motives to better account for
sovereignty yielded to AIIs. We demonstrate the potential importance of including structural
variables by applying the argument to sets of cases in currency cooperation, EU enlargement,
human rights and the environment. We find evidence that structural factors increase the
probability of states yielding sovereignty to AIIs, though structural factors are only a permissive
cause of institution formation.
Convention