Yielding Sovereignty to AIIs
37
rupee). Later these states promised to delegate monetary sovereignty by creating a Gulf
Monetary Union, but failed to implement the agreement (Ramazani, 1988; Zaidi, 1990). The
presence of one structural condition but the absence of the other suggests an explanation for
these states’ pattern of attempted, yet failed, delegation.
The Ozone Institutions
These structural patterns repeat in the cases of international environmental institutions to
limit atmospheric ozone depletion. Cooperative efforts began in 1977 under the auspices of the
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). Building on UNEP efforts, Nordic
countries pushed for a stronger institution that would set limits on the use of ozone-depleting
chemicals, principally chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). These efforts culminated in the 1985 Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone layer. The Vienna Convention was not designed to
be an authoritative institution because of resistance by states like the United States and Germany,
but it did formalize crucial cooperation in research and sharing of scientific information (Sprinz
and Vaahtoranta, 1994). More importantly in the long run, it provided an institutional
framework and a secretariat, under UNEP, upon which later institutions could be built. Parson
places great emphasis on this prior institutional structure as a facilitating condition in bringing
about significant multilateral cooperation (Parson, 1993).
The scientific evidence in favor of a CFC ban amassed rapidly in the 1980s. Yet still many
countries urged caution in efforts to legally restrict the use of ozone-depleting chemicals. A
turning point came when DuPont Corporation, the leading producer of CFCs in the world,
announced that feasible substitutes would be available soon, and the company switched its
position to support a worldwide phase-out. This galvanized U.S. support for a CFC ban. State
motivation for action was now high, and, with an existing institution to build on, states adopted
Convention