Yielding Sovereignty to AIIs
48
7
Most notably, we suggest that the system’s structure does not prevent states from voluntarily giving up slices
of their sovereignty. We start with Waltz’s definition but reach the non-Waltzian conclusion that constraining
system structures can in fact be mitigated in ways that allow the creation of AIIs.
8
We thank John Ferejohn for this suggestion.
9
Previous literature has associated shocks with new demands for solutions to the problems evident in the shock.
We emphasize here that shocks also create opportunities, decreasing the costs of supplying new institutions. We
will have more to say about the interaction between system structure and state demand in the next sub-section.
10
In fact, the Commission increased the size and scope of the EU acquis, so that it demands more sovereignty
concessions of the aspirant members in CEE than it does of existing member states (Grabbe, 1998).
11
The two areas fall under the same cabinet ministry, the Directorate General for Health and Consumer
Protection, which makes relative density easy to measure. Both are still clearly on the low end, however.
12
The widely known case of European Monetary Union follows a similar structural pattern: EMU was agreed to
just as the Cold War ended and built closely on the decade-long success of the EMS fixed exchange rate system.
13
At the same time, their commitment to fixed exchange rates and full capital mobility did away with each
country’s ability to set monetary policy autonomously (Mundell, 1960; 1963; Fleming, 1962), making this an
example of “mutual delegation.”
Convention