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3.
Students also have the option of arming internally. It costs 10 units of wealth to increase their
power by one point. They must write down how much of their wealth they are converting to
security before the game starts; once play begins, no more conversion is allowed.
4.
Have students return to their seats. Seats should be in a circle. Students compute their end
power and end wealth. Start with initial security value, then subtract 1 for each defense pact;
add 1 for each 10 units of wealth converted to power. [This increases dependence on allies
while emphasizing that the risk of being drawn into someone else’s war reduces your
security.]
5.
Place two chairs in the center of the room. Draw two letters and have the corresponding
students come to the chairs. (There should only be as many slips in the envelope as there are
students.)
6.
Have each of the students read their end power aloud. Then ask the students if they would
like to call on their allies for assistance, starting with the ‘weaker’ side.
7.
If they do, each calls the first defense pact from their sheet.
8.
The ally then has the choice of coming up and standing next to the seated ally. They can
defect; if they do ask them why. They may want to do this if one state is hopelessly
outmatched.
9.
If a student is allied with A but has a neutrality pact with B, he/she has the option of honoring
the neutrality pact and remaining seated, or he/she can defect.
10.
If two students are called who have alliances with each other, those alliances are now void
for the rest of the game. [This only affects the primary combatants/initiators, not the allies.]
11.
The losing side’s wealth points are distributed among the winning sides (equally; add up
losers’ wealth, divide by number of players on winning side). [You might allow one
opportunity for players to convert wealth to power (or the other way) in mid-game. If you do,
a good discussion question is what effect that mid-game power switch had on alliance
behavior.)
Discussion questions:
1.
This game was trying to illustrate the war diffusion process (i.e. alliances help wars
spread). Do you think it did an accurate job of it? Why or why not?
2.
Do you think internal balancing is a safer option for all states, or just some? If some,
which ones? (i.e. those that have a lot of initial wealth)
3.
Why might some countries not honor alliances? What kind of message does this send to
other states?
4.
What is the theoretical argument for honoring an alliance with the weaker side?
5.
Why do we divide the losers’ wealth among the winners? Who ends up with wealth at the
end? What good is wealth? Is this closer to a realist or liberal view of power and war?
Convention