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ABSTRACT
This article argues that the events of 9/11 are illustrative of the power of non-state actors and norms
in contemporary international relations. The central role of al-Qaeda in this event epitomizes the
importance of these variables, variables traditionally conceptualized as secondary in international
relations theory. Insofar as international relations theory does not account for their importance,
stocktaking is necessary in terms of the variables that inform its dominant explanations of the structures
and dynamics of global politics. The article’s underlying premise is that the major international relations
theories are each important in emphasizing elements fundamental to international politics, but are often
marred by ahistorical foundations that lead them to downplay or misconstrue the importance of non-state
actors and norms. A closer integration of theory and history that allows one to move away from abstract
projections of singular theoretical models and into theory that is grounded in historical complexity and a
range of theoretical insights is potentially more revealing. An analysis of 9/11 and al-Qaeda based in such
an integrated theoretical accounting, for example, can bring a finer point to an understanding of both the
significance of norms and of organizational self-interest, both the power of non-state movements and of
international state structures, and the necessity of historicizing international relations’ images rather than
seeing international relations as an eternally recurring cycle. More than anything else, however, it can
help us understand a seminal event in contemporary politics.
The paper’s historical foundation is an inquiry into al-Qaeda’s organizational and ideological
evolution. It argues that 9/11 was a brilliant maneuver in that it internationalized the Islamist field of
battle by “goading the ummah”
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(in bin-Laden’s phrase) to frame its enemy as the “Jewish-Christian
West” – represented, in particular, by the United States. This was a contested frame, as most other
Islamist groups resisted this tactical and ideological shift, preferring the status quo of conceptualizing
their battle as being with domestic regimes within defined nation-state borders rather than engaging in an
international war. Al-Qaeda’s split from this domestically-focused Islamism was made real in stunning
fashion by 9/11. The strategic brilliance of this shift in terms of social mobilization – and the resulting
preeminence of al-Qaeda’s frame among Islamists and its resonance even among non-Islamists -- was
demonstrated in how it acted to reverse the late 1990’s marginalization of Islamist movements that had
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“The Islamic community”
Convention