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served to “goad” the Muslim world toward incorporating that internationalized Islamist perspective. Even
if this remains a minority view in the Muslim world, re-framing Islamism as part of a global battle has
resonated in a way that Islamism’s domestic agenda had not. A degree of success in these two normative
projects, however partial and contested, has worked to sustain the internationalization of Islamism’s
theatre of war, the infusion of religion into global ideological battles, and shifts in the actors and
institutions that constitute international relations structures. Third, this has contributed, in turn, to shifts
in international regimes governing the use of force, human rights, and humanitarian law. Each of these is
a change of enormous significance in global politics. Non-state actors may be just one variable in what
constitutes international relations structures, but recognizing their importance is considerably more
realistic than simply focusing on the traditional state basis of international rivalry, even if states remain
quite important.
If 9/11 can be traced to normative constructs and if al-Qaeda epitomizes how non-state actors are
increasingly a part of international relations structures, this indicates that international relations theory
should be historicized rather than ahistorically viewed as based in eternal foundations. Its structures and
agents are contingent on historic circumstance, rather than defining of that circumstance. An historic
accounting for events such as 9/11, therefore, can be used to enrich international relations theory, calling
attention to gaps in the variables on which it has traditionally focused and the need to range among
theoretical perspectives rather than project singular models.
Once 9/11 has been historicized, accounting for its place in international relations means moving
among theoretical paradigms. The tri-cornered hat of international relations theory debates – neo-
realism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism—offer insights into the structures and actors that animate
change in contemporary global politics. Grounded in history, however, one sees each model is not in and
of itself sufficient. Al-Qaeda transgresses the borders within which most international theory has defined
itself and its impact demonstrates that norms and narrow self-interest, non-state actors, trans-
governmental networks, and internationally defined state structures – variables emphasized by the range
of dominant international relations theories – have a discrete interplay in structuring global events such
as 9/11. Only a close integration of history and theory allows one to make structural sense of patterns of
events in a way that accounts for such interplay. Such accounting must be at the core of international
relations, not abstract theorizing.
Convention