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this group (however, defined) would in all likelihood have represented a clear majority of
the population, which makes consent to power-sharing less likely. Third, compounding
this demographic imbalance is the possibility that power-sharing arrangements might
have lacked support in some of the regions involved. Certainly, the Basque Country is a
very polarized society where Basque and Spanish nationalists coexist, the latter more
supportive of majoritarian practices.
Of course, there are other ways to seek to empower minority groups within central
institutions such as having them well-represented in state-wide parties. This has happened
to some degree in Spain with Catalan and Basque politicians having played important
roles within both the PSOE and PP (Narcis Serra, Josep Borrell, Javier Rojo, Jaime
Mayor Oreja, etc…). Of course, the position of politicians from the Basque Country or
Catalonia in Spanish politics does not match that of Quebeckers in Canadian federal
politics, but Canada can be considered an exceptional case. There is also the possibility of
using institutional mechanisms. Spain currently does not have an upper house that
represents the voice of the Autonomous Communities, but proposals for reforming the
Senate into a Bundesrat-type chamber have been discussed. Nationalist movements have
been able to exert political power in Madrid, but that has been as a result of minority
government situations. In this context, empowerment at the center has been a matter of
constraint rather than principle, although nationalist leaders by and large like the idea of
bilateral relationships with Madrid.
A difficult question in democratic Spain has been recognition. As we have seen,
Basque (and Catalan) nationalists insisted at the time of the transition that the new
constitution needed to recognize their historical, political and cultural distinctiveness.
Convention