2
discrimination against certain groups provides them with incentives for ethnopolitical action
because of resulting poverty, powerlessness and resentment among the disadvantaged that
increases the insecurity feeling for groups. In other words, “discrimination and repression increase
the strength of most peoples’ identification with their kindred and motivate them to seek collective
remedies” since they collectively feel insecure (Gurr 2000: 105). In a policy-related context,
discrimination is the most basic manifestation of ethnic conflict at the domestic level that
underlines group borders in a negative way. What makes discrimination a critical concept is the
insecurity and fear it spreads for minorities. Emphasis on ethnic identities through discrimination
creates a security dilemma among groups which explains the focus of the present research project.
According to Saideman (1998) the state has a critical role in mediating or controlling the ethnic
groups for security. In an ideal state, since the state monopolizes the means of violence, minorities
do not compete for security. However, if state does not provide security for different groups, those
groups might decide to compete with each other for their own security. A discriminatory state that
employs policies that will exclude security of a specific group encourages ‘security dilemma’
(Posen 1993).
Disparate affective and instrumental inputs require an analytical framework to sort out their
relative importance and draw meaningful comparisons. Although the purpose of this paper is
rather specific, its underlying mission is to contribute to the establishment of an analytical
framework that can render these general connections meaningful. This study examines attributes of
the host state, most notably, security dilemmas created through levels of economic, political and
religious discrimination and their effects on international support for a minority group. In that
manner, our research attempts to specify the link between discrimination, security dilemma and
third-party intervention. We seek to extend Posen’s (1993) concept of ‘security dilemma’ and
Convention