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P
APER
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BSTRACT
:
This paper seeks to explain why it is so difficult for states and ethnic groups seeking self-
determination to reach agreement over political autonomy and avoid costly conflict. I argue
that states and separatist groups are made up of multiple sub-factions with different aims
regarding autonomy agreements—and that these differences drive the variation we see in
autonomy agreement success. I deduce that agreement is most likely when there are either a
low or very high number of group factions and a moderate number of state factions.
Bargaining is difficult for groups with moderate numbers of factions because they bear high
costs for organizing, generate uncertainty over acceptable deals, are prone to break apart,
and lack the ability to enforce settlements in the face of internal dissent. High-faction
groups face these same challenges, but are likely to get small concessions from the state in an
attempt to buy-off moderates. Moreover, bargaining is difficult for states with either one or
many factions whose consent is necessary for an agreement. One-faction states cannot
commit credibly to honor a settlement, while high-faction states are prone to deadlock
because any faction can hold up a deal if unsatisfied with the terms. I test several hypotheses
resulting from this theory on a 1991 cross-section of self-determination movements.
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I would like to thank David A. Lake, Barbara F. Walter, Philip G. Roeder, and Kristian S. Gleditsch for their
continuing guidance on this project.
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