4
presents a theory to explain this propensity to fail to reach agreement. I argue that
differences in preferences over autonomy and the political institutions that aggregate these
preferences in both states and groups intersect to create significant barriers to agreement.
Specifically, I deduce that heterogeneous preferences over autonomy make bargaining harder
because they can generate internal divisions within each side. Moreover, the institutions
through which these preferences are aggregated can either mitigate or exacerbate the
difficulties that heterogeneous preferences create.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section presents a description of
the political interaction that takes place between the state and the self-determination group,
focusing on the bargaining environment, the usual causes of bargaining failure, and
important characteristics of the key actors. Section Two specifies mechanisms that can
prevent agreement throughout the bargaining process. The third section of the chapter
provides a set of predictions and testable hypotheses generated by my theory. A fourth
section describes the research design and presents preliminary results.
T
HE
P
OLITICS OF
S
ELF
-
DETERMINATION
The politics of self-determination is an ongoing political contest over autonomy
between mobilized minority groups and their parent states. When self-determination
movements are active, the group and the state engage in a continuous bargain over the level
of autonomy that the group will enjoy within the state (or at the extreme, whether the group
will remain part of the state). This bargaining process is sometimes explicit and formal
(carried out through official negotiations), and at other times takes place informally. These
contests take the form of both electoral and physical struggles, with fits and starts of activity
on the part of both self-determination groups and states. Some contests degenerate into
Convention