Anthony Wanis - St.John
Page 3
3/14/2005
Back Channel Diplomacy refers to official negotiations conducted in
secret between the principal parties to a dispute, which operate in parallel
with or replace acknowledged ‘front’ channels of negotiation, and are
potentially at variance with the declared policies of the parties. Back
channels are like the ‘black markets’ of international diplomacy; opening
up separate tables where negotiations take place in the shadows.
Paradoxically, front channel negotiations sometimes falter and are
eclipsed by successful back channel negotiations even though the same
principals, conflict and political context are involved. This article analyzes
a salient international case of parallel use of back channel and front
channel negotiations, and seeks answers to several research questions
relevant to international negotiations in general: How precisely are back
channels different? Why do back channels occasionally lead to
breakthroughs? Why do decisionmakers resort to back channels? What
impact do back channels have on peace processes?
From time immemorial, human beings have been bargaining with each other under challenging
circumstances—including the external contexts in which our negotiations are embedded, and the
internal circumstances and psychological dynamics that affect how we negotiate. One factor in
particular combines both attributes: the presence of a “salient audience.”
1
Audiences, the negotiator’s
‘public’, ‘constituency’ or other group, exert enormous pressure on negotiator behavior simply by
existing. In international negotiations, especially peace processes, audiences do more than simply
exist: they mobilize to shape a leader’s negotiation agenda. Audiences affect the process, conduct and
substance of international negotiations. In their extreme form, as spoilers, they attempt to derail the
negotiations and can try to impact the political and even physical survival of the negotiator. This is the
‘audience effect’ in international negotiation.
Leaders recognize the vast power of a mobilized constituency, and themselves try to shape it,
manipulate it to reduce their own scope for concessions, empower themselves to be ‘powerless’ in the
face of cries for flexibility from their international adversaries and internal political opposition. The
mutual dependence between leader/negotiator and public/constituency is well known. And yet it can
work against the interests of the negotiator. Rubin & Brown noted a marked tendency for negotiators
to make moves damaging to the negotiator’s and constituents’ interests, ironically, because of the
Convention