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3.6) Symbolic imitation
Symbolic imitation is grounded on the idea that decision-makers may choose policies so
as to show that they are acting in a proper ad adequate manner (Meyer and Rowan 1977:
349). In symbolic imitation, thus, normative structures do not operate by removing
alternatives, but by valuing some options more than others. In contemporary societies,
practices become legitimate in the context of a “rationalized environment” (Meyer 1994).
This environment creates organisational and policy models through the
institutionalisation of rules that “define the meaning and identity of the individual and the
pattern of appropriate economic, political and cultural activity engaged in by those
individuals” (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1994). In this context, heterodox policy choices are
not ruled out, as in the case of taken-for-grantedness, but are costly because they will tend
to be seen as illegitimate. Symbolic imitation, thus, has an impact on payoffs rather than
effectiveness. Policies that are in line with the normative environment reward those who
adopt them and, therefore, alter the relative size of the payoffs associated with policy
alternatives. Symbolic imitation thus alters the “policy” component of the decision-
makers’ utility function (P, see equation 1). In addition, it may also alter the “votes”
component (V), as it may help gain legitimacy for unpopular choices. As Meyer and
Rowan (1977) explain, the adoption of policies that conform to prevailing normative
structures can function as a “ceremony” whose aim is to protect decision-makers from
criticism. The adoption of socially valued practices “legitimate[s] organizations with
internal participants, stockholders, the public, and the state” (Meyer and Rowan 1977:
351). Practices with “high ceremonial value” are notably “those reflecting the latest expert
thinking or those with the most prestige” (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 351). Thus, decision-
makers may limit the electoral costs of an unpopular policy if they can show that it is
conform to “best practices” or to expert recommendations.
In line with these views, Wilks and Bartle (2002) argue that the creation of independent
competition authorities in Europe was a means for governments to show that they were
Convention