SCARPERATION:
THE ROLE OF SCARCITY IN FOSTERING COOPERATION BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL RIVER RIPARIANS
Abstract
International conflicts over shared rivers are often resolved through agreements. To date
there exist hundreds of documented agreements that can be identified in numerous
depositories. While several existing analyses explain the extent of cooperative agreements
among basin riparians, most of the published work is confined to the case study approach.
As such, not much can be said, in general, about reasons for and patterns of cooperation
among basin riparians. The aim of this paper is to investigate the cooperation end of
hydropolitics and explain why treaties are negotiated for some river basins and not for others
and among some countries and not others. In addition, this paper seeks to explain why
particular issues were negotiated between a set of countries. The paper develops a theory for
explaining the reasons for (or lack there of), and extent of, cooperation as it is mirrored in
treaties. Chief among the variables for explaining treaty-cooperation is ‘scarcity’ or the
‘critical need’ of basin countries for developing their shared river basins. This paper also
considers other important variables in explaining cooperation patterns. Using several
expressions of cooperation in water allocation issues, the analysis suggests that long-term
water scarcity has a significant influence on levels of cooperation.