9
relevant international regimes. CIEL, a small advisory NGO based in Washington DC,
associated itself with WWF not only because they agreed on compliance policy, but because
WWF had much more political clout.
32
These and a few other NGOs with expertise in
compliance were allowed to present their views during a series of informal workshops
arranged to address the compliance issue. According to one participant, the discussions
maintained an analytical and almost academic atmosphere, even though the topic had the
potential to become politically charged.
33
CIEL and WWF jointly introduced the idea of a
dual approach to compliance, comprising a facilitative body to assist Parties to comply with
their commitments and a judicial-like enforcement body.
34
This basic approach was similar to
the stated US approach to the compliance issue, as tabled at the Vienna workshop. In fact, the
US called for a separation of the facilitative and enforcement functions in a submission before
the Vienna meeting.
35
Still, CIEL/WWF and the US had not worked together on this prior to
Vienna.
36
The dual approach was followed and endorsed by all Parties in the Marrakesh
Accords.
CAN left most of the responsibility for the work with the compliance system to a
small group of experts and most of the green NGOs were neither very interested nor
knowledgeable on the issue. The working group on compliance is CAN’s smallest policy
group. It usually comprises some 20 members and is mostly chaired by CIEL, illustrating the
rather technical and complex nature of the issue. Among the large traditional activist groups,
WWF was most active on the compliance issue while organizations like Greenpeace and
Friends of the Earth were less involved. To some extent this reflects a strategic division of
labor between the NGOs.
37
Some NGOs work mainly on the flexibility mechanisms, some on
compliance, and some mainly on carbon sequestration, land use and land-use change. After
Marrakesh, the CAN compliance group became inactive, because there were no longer any
negotiations going on about compliance.
The legal character of the consequences of non-compliance caused much controversy
in the negotiations. All major green NGOs favored legally binding consequences, but the
decision was deferred to the first COP/MOP after the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force –
seemingly a major setback for the green movement and other “progressive” forces. Although
not much flagged in the media, the US was previously one of the strongest proponents of the
legally binding approach. This could be seen in the pressure it put on reluctant “colleagues” in
the Umbrella Group – Russia, Japan, Canada and Australia. The new administration,
however, changed strategy, which promptly punctured the pressure on the “gang of four.” It
appears that the new US negotiation team wanted to uphold its position on this issue, as it was
an important principle of US policy, but they were apparently given direct orders from the
White House to change position.
38
Despite the eagerness of the EU and others to conclude the
agreement, the reluctant Parties were successful in achieving a postponement to the
COP/MOP. While green NGOs regretted the outcome, some of them remained pragmatic
32. Andresen’s interview with Glenn Wiser, CIEL, Washington D.C., 19 March 2002.
33. Werksman forthcoming.
34. Morgan and Porter 1999.
35. The US submission is dated July 30, 1999. See UNFCCC 1999.
36. Andresen’s interview with Glenn Wiser, CIEL, Washington D.C., 19 March 2002.
37. Authors’ interview with Michel Raquet, Greenpeace European Unit, Brussels, 4 July 2002.
38. Personal communication from US observer to authors.
Convention