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along with direct guidance and oversight, to impoverished states.
19
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A division of labor now exists in this functional category as MCC funds are directed
toward “top”performers in the area of political and economic reforms while USAID funds to to
“good” and “fair” performers, as measured by the MCC performance criteria. This means that
USAID will provide support for selected “threshold" countries, or those just missing
identification as candidates for MCC funding.
Despite the many uncertainties related to U.S. economic aid, it is clear that the existing
institutional arrangements will shape the choices available to decision-makers in both branches
of government. These arrangements, the evolutionary by-products of multiple decisions made by
successive presidential administrations and congresses, will determine both the capacities and
limitations of U.S. foreign aid in the years to come. The wide range of institutional outlets
currently in place, and the lack of effective coordinating mechanisms, provide ample
opportunities for presidents of widely varying ideological complexions to mold the U.S. foreign-
aid complex to their policy preferences. Members of Congress will also retain their ability to
achieve variant domestic and foreign-policy objectives through the aid complex. While this
system may face a variety of structural deficiencies, and while it may continue to confront deeply
held public and elite skepticism, the institutional malleability of U.S. foreign aid will continue to
serve as its defining feature.
Convention