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Reagan and Gorbachev: Altercasting at the End of the Cold War
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cooperative and conflictual tactics (I-4a). Here he values appeal tactics (I-5c) significantly morethan he used to while his belief in the utility of oppose (I-5d) and punish tactics (I-5f) decreasedsignificantly. In sum, Reagan’s enemy image of Gorbachev gave way to a new image withfriendlier attributes (see Table 3).
Accordingly, Reagan’s aggregated VICS scores indicate a mutually cooperative stance in theperiod between 1987 and 1988. They specify the strategic preference ranking in Proposition 2 forSelf (I-1 = .39, P-4a = .15) and Proposition 3 for Other (P-1 = .25, P-4b = .27). Reagan’s strategyis thus an Assurance strategy that ranks settlement over deadlock over domination oversubmission. At the same time he perceives Gorbachev to adopt a Stag Hunt strategy rankingsettlement over domination over deadlock over submission. His redefined subjective game ismapped out below.
Gorbachev
Gorbachev
Gorbachev
CO
CF
CO
CF
CO
CF
CO
4,4
1,3
CO
Settle
Submit
CO
4,4
| 1,3
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
CF
2,1
“3,2”
CF
Dominate Deadlock
CF
2,1
“3,2”
Reagan’s strategy
UNITED STATES OUTCOMES
Reagan’s perception ofGorbachev’s strategy
*The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. Thesymbols “
” and “
| ” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with
the next move (Self) given the initial state (Brams, 1994).
The initial state of (3,2) indicates Reagan’s belief that there continued to be points of mutualcontention between the superpowers after Reykjavik. However, he appears to believe now thatrapprochement and increased cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would bepossible. The conflictual Prisoner’s Dilemma game of the previous two years had beentransformed, in Reagan’s mind, into a more cooperative game. The prediction is that Reagan willmove towards the final state of (4,4) in his anticipation that Gorbachev would do the same.
A general willingness to cooperate was shown in Soviet-American bilateral diplomaticconsultations throughout 1987. In March 1897, the U.S. initiated various forms of diplomaticexchanges continuing through September. Discussions were held regarding communicationexchanges, the United Nations, human rights, and regional conflicts. Of particular importancewas that both sides together attempted to bring a resolution to conflicts in the Middle East, theFar East, and Southeast Asia. The most significant initiative, however, came from Gorbachev. Inan unprecedented move he decoupled SDI from any INF missiles agreements on February 28
th
(Crockatt, 1995: 361; Gates, 1996: 421). This concession put the INF element of the nucleararms talks, which had beem deadlocked after the Reykjavik summit, back on track. At the sametime Gorbachev also kept stressing his agenda of “reasonable sufficiency” in military affairs.
Reagan welcomed these steps and displayed a cooperative attitude as well. However, now hechallenged the Soviet Union to include shorter range INF [SRINF] missiles in any agreement toprotect allied security interests. Gorbachev conceded and proposed to first freeze and then cutthese systems. About one month later, on July 23, Gorbachev proposed a global double zero,
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cooperative and conflictual tactics (I-4a). Here he values appeal tactics (I-5c) significantly more
than he used to while his belief in the utility of oppose (I-5d) and punish tactics (I-5f) decreased
significantly. In sum, Reagan’s enemy image of Gorbachev gave way to a new image with
friendlier attributes (see Table 3).
Accordingly, Reagan’s aggregated VICS scores indicate a mutually cooperative stance in the
period between 1987 and 1988. They specify the strategic preference ranking in Proposition 2 for
Self (I-1 = .39, P-4a = .15) and Proposition 3 for Other (P-1 = .25, P-4b = .27). Reagan’s strategy
is thus an Assurance strategy that ranks settlement over deadlock over domination over
submission. At the same time he perceives Gorbachev to adopt a Stag Hunt strategy ranking
settlement over domination over deadlock over submission. His redefined subjective game is
mapped out below.
Gorbachev
Gorbachev
Gorbachev
CO
CF
CO
CF
CO
CF
CO
4,4
1,3
CO
Settle
Submit
CO
4,4
| 1,3
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
CF
2,1
“3,2”
CF
Dominate Deadlock
CF
2,1
“3,2”
Reagan’s strategy
UNITED STATES OUTCOMES
Reagan’s perception of
Gorbachev’s strategy
*The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The
symbols “
” and “
| ” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with
the next move (Self) given the initial state (Brams, 1994).
The initial state of (3,2) indicates Reagan’s belief that there continued to be points of mutual
contention between the superpowers after Reykjavik. However, he appears to believe now that
rapprochement and increased cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be
possible. The conflictual Prisoner’s Dilemma game of the previous two years had been
transformed, in Reagan’s mind, into a more cooperative game. The prediction is that Reagan will
move towards the final state of (4,4) in his anticipation that Gorbachev would do the same.
A general willingness to cooperate was shown in Soviet-American bilateral diplomatic
consultations throughout 1987. In March 1897, the U.S. initiated various forms of diplomatic
exchanges continuing through September. Discussions were held regarding communication
exchanges, the United Nations, human rights, and regional conflicts. Of particular importance
was that both sides together attempted to bring a resolution to conflicts in the Middle East, the
Far East, and Southeast Asia. The most significant initiative, however, came from Gorbachev. In
an unprecedented move he decoupled SDI from any INF missiles agreements on February 28
th
(Crockatt, 1995: 361; Gates, 1996: 421). This concession put the INF element of the nuclear
arms talks, which had beem deadlocked after the Reykjavik summit, back on track. At the same
time Gorbachev also kept stressing his agenda of “reasonable sufficiency” in military affairs.
Reagan welcomed these steps and displayed a cooperative attitude as well. However, now he
challenged the Soviet Union to include shorter range INF [SRINF] missiles in any agreement to
protect allied security interests. Gorbachev conceded and proposed to first freeze and then cut
these systems. About one month later, on July 23, Gorbachev proposed a global double zero,
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